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THE UNIVERSITY  OF IOWA, HOOVER INSTITUTION 
Equilibrium  Interpretations  of 
Employment  and  Real  Wage 
Fluctuations 
The  question  of the influence  on real wages of periods  of boom  and depression  has a long 
history.  J.M. Keynes (1939). 
Observed  real wages are not constant  over the cycle, but neither  do they exhibit  consistent 
pro- or countercyclical  tendencies.  This suggests that any attempt  to assign systematic  real 
wage movements  a central  role in an explanation  of business  cycles  is doomed  to failure. 
Accordingly,  I will proceed  as though  the real wage were  fixed . . . Robert Lucas (1977, 
p. 226). 
This change  implies  a substitution  effect,  which  favors today's  consumption  and deters 
today's  leisure. Therefore,  . . . it becomes  possible  to generate  the typical  pattern  of 
business  cycles, which  features  positive  co-movements  of current  output, work  effort, 
investment,  and consumption.  But notice  that the real  wage rate, which  equals  the 
marginal  product  of labor,  must rise along with the increases  in output and work  effort.  In 
other  words, a procyclical  pattern  for the real  wage rate is central  to our theoretical 
analysis. Robert Barro and Robert King (1984, p. 833). 
The  problem  with the simple  competitive  model  is that it interprets  the observed 
employment-wage  combinations  as points on a simple, static labor  supply curve. A glance 
at the data  for the United States  and many other  economies  shows large  movements  of 
employment  occurring  at the same time that the real wage remains  unchanged.  There  are 
two possible  explanations  within the simple  model.  First, the labor  supply schedule  may be 
highly wage elastic. But a large  literature  on labor  supply contradicts  that view. Static 
labor  supply is only slightly wage elastic, and then only for workers  with major  non-work 
alternatives.  The  second  potential  explanation  is that shifts of the labor  supply schedule 
may be a principal  driving  force in the economy,  so that the observed  wage-employment 
combinations  are on an elastic  labor  demand  schedule.  In the second  view, the typical 
recession  occurs  because  people  have decided  not to work  as hard  as usual. That  view has 158  KENNAN 
no important  support  in the  literature,  to our  knowledge.  David Lilien  and Robert  Hall 
(1986,  p. 1012-1013). 
1. Introduction 
This paper is primarily an attempt to document  the  facts about cyclical 
fluctuations in employment  and real wages,  using postwar monthly  data 
from  manufacturing  industries  in  six  countries.  The  main  question  is 
whether or not the data could have been generated by equilibrium models 
of the  labor market. This question  cannot be  answered  by representing 
employment  as an optimal dynamic response  to an exogenous  stochastic 
process  for real wages;  one  must  also explain how  the  wage  process  is 
generated. The data are first summarized in terms of relative variability and 
correlation, and  patterns of serial correlation. A competitive  equilibrium 
model is then used to provide a framework in which these statistics can be 
interpreted. A variation on this model is also presented, in which a central 
labor  union  acts  as  a  monopoly  seller  of  labor.  The  competitive  and 
monopoly  equilibria are closely  related,  and  either  could,  in  principle, 
explain the data. 
As the above quote from Lilien and Hall makes clear, it is difficult for a 
static equilibrium model  of the labor market, which  is driven mainly by 
shocks  on  the demand  side,  to reconcile an inelastic labor supply  curve 
with  aggregate employment  and real wage  fluctuations.  The difficulty is 
two-fold: if the data lie close to an inelastic supply curve, then the real wage 
should vary more than employment,  and the real wage should be strongly 
procyclical. It is unusual to find either of these features in the data. It is also 
difficult for an equilibrium model to explain the serial correlation found in 
the bivariate process  for employment  and real wages.  As will be shown 
below,  this process has two roots close to the unit circle, and a third root 
which is much smaller in magnitude,  and generally negative. 
When  a  dynamic  model  is  used  to  interpret  serial  correlation,  the 
prediction of a procyclical real wage can be made to disappear. This is one 
of the most surprising results in the paper. For example, it will be shown 
(in  Table  6)  that  UK  employment  and  real  wage  data  accept  a  null 
hypothesis  in which labor supply is relatively inelastic, less than 26 percent 
of the variance in employment  is due to labor supply  shocks, and yet the 
correlation coefficient between  the  innovations  in employment  and  real 
wages is only .1. It is important to note from this example that there is a big 
difference between  a model  that is  driven exclusively  by  labor demand 
shocks,  and a model that admits small labor supply  shocks.  On the other 
hand,  the dynamic  model  does  not succeed  in explaining the U.S.  data, Employment  and  Real  Wages  *  159 
primarily because  in these  data employment  is much more variable than 
the real wage. 
This paper focuses  on some basic issues concerning the construction of 
structural models  of the labor market. There is a large body  of empirical 
literature that has been written recently on the general subject of employ- 
ment fluctuations. The motivating force behind this literature is a desire to 
explain,  and  help  remedy,  the  dramatic rise  in  unemployment  rates 
experienced by many developed  countries over the last fifteen years. For 
example, Layard and Nickell (1986) presented a comprehensive  attempt to 
explain  British unemployment,  and  Burda and  Sachs  (1987) analyzed 
unemployment  increases  in Germany.  The main explanation  offered by 
Layard and Nickell  (1986) was  that the  demand  curve for labor shifted. 
Demand was represented by the "cyclically adjusted" government budget 
deficit, the deviation of world trade from a polynomial trend of fifth order, 
and  (perhaps)  the  terms  of  trade.  All  three  of  these  variables  moved 
strongly in the wrong direction, especially after 1979. The Burda and Sachs 
explanation  was  that wages  were  too  high  to clear the  labor market in 
Germany.  In  both  Germany  and  the  U.S.  the  manufacturing  wage  is 
supposedly  rigid because of unions,  so that when  a demand shock (due to 
oil  prices  or  "productivity  slowdown")  hits  the  manufacturing  sector 
employment  is reduced. This spills over into the service sector. In the U.S. 
the service sector has flexible wages,  so when  the wage  falls full employ- 
ment  is  restored.  In  Germany  wages  are  rigid  across  the  board,  so 
unemployment  rises.1 Newell and Symons (1987)  blamed OPEC for the rise 
in  unemployment.  Higher  oil prices meant  that lower  real wages  were 
needed  to sustain employment,  but workers were  stubborn. Meanwhile, 
higher oil prices also caused inflation, and governments induced recessions 
to combat this inflation.2 
The  connection  between  employment  and  real wages  has  also  been 
extensively studied at the micro level, using U.S. data. First, there are labor 
supply studies, which measure the response of individual workers to wage 
variations along a given age-earnings profile, and to shifts in the profile (see 
Pencavel (1986), and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986)). Second,  Stock- 
man (1983), Bils (1985), Moffitt, Keane, and Runkle (1987), and Blank (1987) 
have used  micro data to study wage changes for individuals in relation to 
changes in aggregate hours worked. These studies concluded that the real 
wage is mildly procyclical in the U.S.-although  it seems difficult to obtain 
1. Estimates of the NAIRU for Germany suggest  strong secular increases. But the estimation 
procedure probably does  little more than reflect the upward trend in the measured rate. 
2. No attempt was made to measure the effect of higher oil prices on the equilibrium marginal 
product of labor, in order to compare this with real-wage movements. 160  KENNAN 
reliable estimates  of cyclical effects, given that the panel data contain less 
than 15 annual observations over the same time period for each individual. 
The finding  of procyclical real wages  in U.S.  data is also clear in Neftci's 
(1978) analysis of aggregate monthly data, and it appears in Sargent's (1981) 
quarterly results. It does not seem to show up for other countries, however, 
and it is sensitive  to the choice of deflator, as was  shown  in Geary and 
Kennan (1982). In any case, as was mentioned above, dynamic equilibrium 
models  of  the  labor market do  not  make  strong  predictions  about  the 
cyclicality of real wages. 
2. Data Analysis 
If employment  and real wages are generated mainly by the impact of labor 
demand  shocks  on  a competitive  labor market, then  the  data should  lie 
close to a dynamic labor supply function. If this supply function is inelastic, 
the variation in real wages  should be larger than the variability in employ- 
ment.  Since  the  shocks  are  predominantly  on  the  demand  side,  the 
variations  in  real wages  and  in  employment  should  be  closely  related 
(because they are driven by a common force), and the relationship should 
be  procyclical. The prevailing view  is that the  data do  not  support  this 
story,  so that an intertemporal substitution model  of the business  cycle, 
driven by productivity shocks, is implausible. 
As it stands, this description of the data is imprecise. For example, given 
that some  shocks  hit the supply  side of the labor market, how  small are 
these shocks supposed  to be, relative to the demand shocks? Assume  that 
the supply  and demand  shocks are uncorrelated, so that the variation in 
employment  can be decomposed  into two uncorrelated components,  one 
driven by supply, and the other by demand. A useful summary of the data 
can then be made by assuming  that the standard deviation of the supply 
component  is  small,  relative to  the  standard  deviation  of  the  demand 
component. 
Write the supply  and demand curves for labor as 
w(t) = gsn(t) + vs(t)  (2.1) 
and 
w(t) = gdn(t) +  vd(t)  (2.2) 
where vs(t) and vd(t)  are the supply and demand shocks, with variances c2 
and c2. For the moment I will take w(t) and n(t) to be first differences of the 
logs of real wages  and employment,  so that gs and gd are the reciprocals of Employment  and  Real  Wages  *  161 
the supply and demand elasticities. The equilibrium values of n(t) and w(t) 
are 
d(t) d(t)  -  vs(t)  gsvd(t)  -  gdvs(t)  (2 
n*(t)  Wt)  =  (2.3) 
gs  -  gd  gs  -  gd 
The variance of employment  is 
ar2 +  a- 
Var[n*(t)] =  (2.4) 
(gs  -  gd)2 
Thus, the relative importance of supply and demand shocks in explain- 
ing employment  fluctuations can be measured by the parameter 8 =  oa  lau. 
When a value is assigned  to 6, the supply and demand  elasticities can be 
identified  from the variance matrix of employment  and real wages  (as is 
shown  in Appendix  A).  The estimates  in Table 1 below  assume  8 =  .2, 
meaning that the standard deviation of the demand-induced  component  of 
employment  is  five  times  the  standard deviation  of the  supply-induced 
component.3  Of course,  there might be an argument about whether  this 
overstates the relative importance of labor supply shocks; and the point of 
the exercise is to allow the data to get in on this argument. 
Table 1 shows the variance matrix of the changes in employment  and real 
wages,  each measured in logs,  for various countries and sample periods. 
Since the use of seasonally adjusted or time-averaged (quarterly or annual) 
data may cloud the measurement of serial correlation, I have chosen to use 
unadjusted monthly data.4 This has the disadvantage that only 5 or 6 data 
sets  are  available,  even  for  manufacturing.  The  hours  variable  is  the 
product  of  average  hours  per  worker  times  the  number  of  workers 
employed;  the  latter variable is  also  analyzed  as  an  alternative to  total 
hours.  The  wage  variable generally  represents  wage  rates,  rather than 
earnings  (further details of the data may be found  in Appendix  B, along 
3. The point of this exercise is to assume that most of the variation in employment  comes from 
demand  shocks,  not that the demand shocks are more variable than the supply shocks in 
some absolute sense. John Taylor pointed out that the supply and demand functions could 
be renormalized as n =  h5w +  u5 and n =  hdW +  Ud, and one could then assume  that the 
ratio of the standard deviations of us and Ud  is .2. This would give different (and apparently 
meaningless)  results.  The procedure  discussed  in the  text, however,  is invariant under 
renormalization, since the variance of employment,  and its decomposition  into supply and 
demand  components,  are invariant. 
4. All  regressions  included  seasonal  dummy  variables,  and  the  levels  regressions  also 
included a linear trend. Table 1  RELATIVE  VARIABILITY  OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT AND  REAL WAGES 
CPI deflator  WPI deflator 
Std Deviations  Correlation  Elasticities  Std Dev  Correlation  Elasticities 
,7,  a-w  C,,w  ~s  ed  W,,  C,,  dnw 
Postwar 
Employment 
Austria  1965-83  0.614  1.785 
Canada  1947-86  0.802  0.645 
Japan  1952-85  0.543  1.332 
UK  1953-83  0.387  1.375 
U.S.  1947-86  0.949  0.501 
Hours 
Canada  1947-86  1.554  0.645 
Japan  1952-85  2.034  1.332 
UK  1963-83  1.224  1.572 
U.S.  1947-86  1.370  0.501 
Employment 
Canada  1947-69  0.689  0.579 
Japan  1952-69  0.529  1.154 
UK  1953-69  0.246  0.774 
U.S.  1947-69  1.006  0.521 
Hours 
Canada  1947-69  1.407  0.579 
Japan  1952-69  1.716  1.154 
UK  1963-69  0.379  0.685 


















1.062  -0.071  1.755 
4.879  -0.252  0.796 
1.598  -0.083  1.318 
1.546  -0.056  1.301 
4.836  -0.403  0.619 
26.165  -0.475  0.796 
3.965  -0.323  1.318 
4.036  -0.156  1.518 
10.673  -0.554  0.619 
Pre-1970 
5.016  -0.240  0.785 
2.353  -0.092  1.013 
1.343  -0.064  0.641 
4.652  -0.414  0.552 
12.786  -0.485  0.785 
3.909  -0.315  1.013 
-6.055  -0.109  0.604 


















2.325  -0.069 
4.960  -0.202 
2.395  -0.082 
1.918  -0.059 
7.879  -0.306 
23.219  -0.384 
3.590  -0.334 
5.259  -0.16 
16.24  -0.438 
6.653  -0.173 
20.782  -0.102 
1.824  -0.077 
9.743  -0.364 
21.423  -0.353 
3.910  -0.367 
-4.136  -0.124 
20.780  -0.485 Post-1970 
Employment 
Canada  1970-86  0.867  0.629 
Japan  1970-85  0.282  1.241 
Denmark  1971-86  0.725  1.221 
UK  1970-83  0.440  1.775 
U.S.  1970-86  0.819  0.414 
Hours 
Canada  1970-86  1.211  0.629 
Japan  1970-85  1.363  1.241 
Denmark  1971-86  4.929  1.221 
UK  1970-83  1.442  1.775 






3.568  -0.292  0.751 
0.965  -0.046  1.321 
2.711  -0.119 
1.355  -0.049  1.726 
5.054  -0.420  0.644 
0.111  6.219  -0.396  0.751 
0.336  2.095  -0.251  1.321 
0.059  15.616  -0.819 
0.008  3.901  -0.163  1.726 









3.245  -0.242 
2.163  -0.042 
1.892  -0.050 
5.769  -0.256 
6.306  -0.326 
2.468  -0.222 
5.274  -0.166 
15.818  -0.394 
Explanation  of  Table  1:  The table  shows standard  summary  statistics  for monthly  data  on four  variables:  number  of workers  employed,  total  hours  worked  (number  employed 
times  average  hours  per worker),  average  hourly  earnings  deflated  by a consumer  price  index, and average  hourly  earnings  deflated  by a wholesale  price  index. The log of 
each series  was first  differenced  and regressed  on a constant  and monthly  dummies,  and the standard  errors  of the residuals  from these regressions  are listed under the 
columns  labeled  a, (for  employment  or hours)  and crw  (for  real  wages). The columns  labeled  C,,,,  show the correlation  coefficients  of the residuals  from  the employment 
regression  and the residuals  from  the real wage regression. 
In  addition  to these  standard  measures  of variability  and correlation,  the table  also  includes  illustrative  estimates  of supply  and demand  elasticities,  which  are  simple  functions 
of o,,, oa  and C,,,  defined  by: 
1/6  =  aw,[C,w+.2(1-C2,w)l2],  1/5  a  =  aw,[C1,,.-5(1-C2,,.)"12],  a,,,,, =  ajcr,, 
The rationale for these estimates  is discussed  in the text, and described in detail in Appendix  A. 164  KENNAN 
with a supplementary table of variability  statistics for nominal wages, 
prices, interest  rates, and the money supply). 
The  variability  of each series  is measured  in Table  1 by regressing  the first 
difference  of the log of the series  on a constant  and monthly  dummies, and 
taking the standard  error  of the residual  from this regression.  This gives 
typical  monthly percentage  changes, aside from  trend and seasonal  varia- 
tion. In the case of a random  walk  with drift,  for  example,  variability  would 
be measured  as the standard  deviation  of the innovation. 
The usual "stylized  facts"  about  employment  and real  wages are  in some 
cases at odds with the facts in Table  1. Employment  is more variable  than 
real wages in Canada and the U.S., but not in the other countries. In 
general,  hours  worked  are  more  variable  than  real  wages, but not by a wide 
margin,  and not for all countries;  real  wages are more  variable  in the U.K. 
and this hold for both sub-periods  covered in the table. Correlations  of 
employment  and real wage changes are weak and of irregular  sign. 
It is not generally  true that  the bulk of the variation  in total  hours comes 
from variation  in employment, although this is true for the U.S. and to 
some extent for Canada. Coleman (1987)  interprets  the U.S. data as an 
indication  that most of the cyclical  variation  in hours worked occurs  at the 
extensive  margin,  and cannot  be successfully  modeled as optimal  behavior 
by a representative  agent. An alternative  interpretation  is discussed  below. 
Table  1 also shows the elasticity  estimates  implied  by the presumption 
that supply and demand shocks are uncorrelated,  and that most of the 
variance in  employment is  due  to  the  demand shocks (8 = .2). The 
elasticities are reported in the conventional  form  s =  1/gs, and  (d  =  1/gd, 
showing the logarithmic  derivative  of employment  with respect  to a change 
in the real  wage. The results  clearly  confirm  the standard  view that under 
these assumptions  large  supply elasticities  would be needed to fit the data. 
The Japanese  data seem most likely to conform  to the idea that the data 
should lie near an inelastic  labor supply function. The variability  of total 
hours in Japan is roughly equal to that of real wages, and there is a 
substantial  positive  correlation  between hours  and real  wages. Even so, the 
implied  point estimates  of the supply elasticity  for  Japan  are  high:  between 
2.1 and 4.0 for hours worked. 
Since the correlation  coefficients  in Table 1 are generally  close to zero, 
inelastic  supply curve  estimates  could  be obtained  by regressing  real  wages 
on employment (as is pointed out by John  Taylor  in his comment  on this 
paper). Thus, it may seem paradoxical  that the estimates  in the table all 
indicate highly elastic supply curves. In the case of the U.K. postwar 
employment data, for example, the scatter  diagram  for employment and 
real  wages looks like a fat cigar  standing  almost  upright.  The trouble  is that 
if these data are explained  as the intersection  points of a shifting  demand Employment  and  Real  Wages  * 165 
curve along  a steep  supply  curve,  most  of the variation in employment 
must be explained by shifts in the supply  curve. In the extreme case of a 
vertical supply curve, employment would not change at all if there were no 
labor supply  shocks.5 
Relative  variability of  employment  and  real wages  is  displayed  in  a 
different  way  in  Figure  1,  which  plots  the  two  series  in  logs  (after 
subtracting the sample means, but without adjusting for trends or season- 
als). The plots are all drawn on the same grid to avoid optical illusions. The 
plots  confirm that U.S.  employment  is generally more variable than real 
wages,  but the real wage  series is highly  variable from 1970-1980. After 
1970, there is a drop in manufacturing employment  in all countries,6 and 
the  upward  trend in real wages  is broken (except in Japan, where  it is 
merely bent). There are some unusually large real wage  movements  from 
1970-1980, particularly in the U.K.7 There are big differences in seasonal 
patterns  of  hours  across  countries,  with  Denmark  showing  the  most 
dramatic differences. 
2.1 CAUSALITY  TESTS 
Table 2 shows  the results of tests for Granger-causality from real wages  to 
hours  worked,  and  vice  versa,  using  alternative deflators  and  sample 
periods.  Several  tests  of  homogeneity  are  also  shown,  including  tests 
designed  to indicate whether  nominal wages  help  forecast employment, 
given that real wages are already included in the regression. Aside from the 
innovation  correlations shown  at the bottom of the table, the numbers are 
all p-values of F-statistics, giving the level of significance at which the null 
hypothesis  would  just be rejected. 
The  most  important  feature  of  Table 2  is  that  the  results  show  no 
regularity across countries and data periods. Each causality hypothesis  is 
tested  along a row of the table; it is sometimes  strongly rejected (i.e.  the 
p-value is near zero), and sometimes  easily accepted. This suggests  that it 
5. This point is well-known (although  easily forgotten-by me). For example, Hall (1980) 
estimated  that  government  military  expenditures  generate  movements  along  an aggregate 
supply curve with an elasticity  of around  one-half.  In response, Barro  (1980)  pointed out 
that  this does not validate  the intertemporal  substitution  model  of employment  fluctuations 
unless  it can  also  be shown that  movements  in the relevant  real-wage  variable  explain  most 
of the movements  in employment. 
6. The plot of manufacturing  employment  in the U.K. looks like a mirror  image of the 
unemployment  plot for Britain  in Layard  and Nickell  (1986,  page S122). 
7. Drobny  and Gausden  (1986)  discuss  the effects  of incomes  policies  on real  wages in the U.K. 
over the period 1976-1978.  They argue that the data for these years (when included) 
dominate  estimated  employment/real-wage  relationships.  Although their data are quar- 
terly,  the monthly  data  used here  are  even more  striking.  In particular,  the average  nominal 
wage in manufacturing  rose  by 16  percent  in a single  month  in April  1978,  and  by 10  percent 
in November  1979,  due mainly  to delayed  wage increases  for engineering  workers. 166  KENNAN 
Figure  1 RELATIVE  VARIABILITY  OF EMPLOYMENT  AND  REAL WAGES. 
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Figure  1 (CONTINUED) 
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will be difficult to find a unified theory of cyclical fluctuations in the labor 
market. One regularity that is included in the table, for the record, is the 
result that the real wage  is a state variable; the  serial correlation in real 
wages  cannot be explained by serial correlation in hours worked.  This is 
obvious to anyone who  has looked at time-series data, but it is important, 
nevertheless,  since theoretical models typically introduce serial correlation 
by putting adjustment costs on quantities, rather than on prices. In such 
models,  prices  do  not  become  state  variables  unless  additional  serial 
correlation is allowed  in the disturbances. 
Another noteworthy feature of Table 2 is that null hypotheses  are almost 
always false for Japan. In particular, homogeneity  fails drastically for Japan, 
with  nominal  wages  being  much  more  important  than  real  wages  in 
determining  hours  worked.  This  lack of  homogeneity  is  not  explored 
further in this paper. 
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RW  0 
H  .352 







What Causes  Hours Worked? 
.129  .805  .000  .325  .580  .937  .222 
.431  .622  .004  .012  .007  .601  .024 
.204  .460  .063  .305  .082  .714  .338 
.885  .445  .000  .000  .041  .800  .142 
.164  .746  .000  .001  .048  .913  .135 
.105  .687  .001  .014  .624  .948  .721 
What Causes  Real Wages? (WPI) 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
.021  .026  .000  .042  .393  .007  .223 
.016  .272  .000  .001  .308  .023  .735 
What Causes  Real Wages? (CPI) 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
.003  .033  .000  .613  .579  .152  .028 
.105  .143  .001  .467  .461  .019  .314 






.035  .581  .940 
.128  .025  .792 
.074  .088  .939 
.080  .000  .719 
.000  .000  .983 
.000  .000  .984 
0  0  0 
.000  .017  .482 
.040  .000  .496 
0  0  0  0 
.000  .007  .004  .390 
.725  .400  .000  .261 
-.005  -0.94  .013  .161  .075  -.181  -.075  .035 
.109  -.061  .025  .166  .231  -.195  .084  .068 
.228  .149  .007 
.073  .199  .290  .050 
Explanation:  This table contains  p-values for tests that use  12 lags of each  variable. Linear trends and seasonal  dummies  were  included  in all regressions.  Causality  from 
employment  to real wages,  and vice versa, is tested in a bivariate VAR. The notation RW.CPI means  the nominal wage  deflated by the CPI, and similarly for RW.WPI. 
The line marked "WICPI"  tests whether  lagged wages  can be excluded  from a regression that uses  12 lags of employment,  nominal wages,  and consumer  prices to predict 
employment; similarly for "CPIIW",  etc. For example, the column labeled "U.S. 70-86" shows  that the hypothesis  of no Granger-causality from the real wage to hours worked 
is just rejected at the 0.7% level when  the wage is deflated by the CPI, and accepted at any level below 58% when  the wage  is deflated by the WPI. This column also  shows 
(at the row labeled "WICPI")  that the hypothesis  of no Granger-causality from the nominal wage  to hours worked,  in a regression  equation which  already includes  12 lags 
of the CPI, is just rejected at the 4.1% level. 
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2.2 TIME-SERIES  MODELS  OF EMPLOYMENT,  HOURS  WORKED 
AND REAL  WAGES 
In order to document  the serial correlation found in employment  and real 
wages,  simple ARIMA models  were fit to the data for each country. The 
results, shown  in Table 3, extend the Ashenfelter and Card (1982) discus- 
sion  of  the  time-series  properties  of  U.S.  quarterly data.  Each model 
included a linear trend and seasonal dummies.  The first thing to be said is 
that any model  that ignores  serial correlation obviously  has no chance of 
fitting these data. The overall success of the ARIMA models in accounting 
for  serial  correlation may  be  judged  by  the  p-value  of  the  Box-Pierce 
Q-statistic which checks for serial correlation in the residuals. The cleanest 
result is that U.K. hours worked can be well described by a simple AR(1) 
model.  An AR(2) fits the Danish hours data, and an ARMA(2,1) model is 
almost  adequate  for the  U.S.,  but no  satisfactory model  was  found  for 
hours worked in Canada or Japan. The real wage can be described to a first 
approximation by a random walk, but this approximation leaves consider- 
able serial correlation unaccounted for, and no simple real wage model was 
found  which  would  pass  the  Box-Pierce test,  except  for  Austria.  One 
important reason for failure of these  simple ARIMA models  was  that the 
pattern of seasonal variation was too complicated to be explained by simply 
including monthly  dummies.8 
3. An Econometric  Model  of Competitive  Equilibrium  in the 
Labor  Market 
In the following sections of the paper, I will analyze fully-specified models 
of labor market equilibrium, which are potentially capable of explaining the 
weak  empirical association between  employment  and  real wages,  while 
accounting for the strong serial correlation patterns described in Section 2. 
The models  are built around a framework suggested  by Sargent (1979), in 
which representative workers and employers take real wages as given, and 
choose  employment  according  to  dynamic  labor  supply  and  demand 
functions.  In Section 4 a modified  version  of this model  will be used  to 
represent optimal dynamic wage-setting by a monopoly  union which faces 
a dynamic labor demand curve. The empirical implications of these models 
are examined in Section 5 below. 
This paper  does  not  give  a complete  account  of  the  various  possible 
equilibrium interpretations of labor market fluctuations.  Two alternatives 
must  be  described  briefly,  in  order to  put  things  in  perspective.  First, 
8. Experiments with seasonal adjustment in the frequency domain were not successful either. 170  KENNAN 
Table  3  UNIVARIATE  TIME-SERIES  MODELS 
Austria  Canada  Denmark  Japan  U.K.  U.S. 






SEE  (xlOO0) 
Q-stat (p-value) 
1.96  1.87  1.93 
(se)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
-0.96  -0.87  -0.94 
(se)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
-0.87  -0.78  -0.74 
(se)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
0.45  0.80  0.66 
.004  0  .38 











1.91  1.75 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
-0.91  -0.77 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
-0.71  -0.44 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
0.41  0.86 
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0.78  0.55  0.94 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.12) 
0.21  0.31  0.05 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.12) 
-0.39 
(0.I1) 
1.36  4.30  1.86 
0  .95  0 
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-0.38  -0.11 





4.40  1.47 
.84  0 
Re;al  Wage (CPI) 
0.99  1.00  0.97 
(se)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
-0.37 
(se)  (0.07) 
1.69  0.64  1.27 
.16  .000  .003 
-0.09  0.77 




(0.  10) 
1.26  1.32 
.26  .07 
.989  0.95  0.996 
(0.008)  (0.02)  (0.004) 
1.32  1.61  0.47 
0  .005  .0001 
0.90  1.77 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
0.08  -0.79 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
-0.59 
(0.  10) 
1.27  1.30 
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competitive equilibrium can be decentralized in various ways. For example, 
labor contracts might set the employment  level efficiently, while specifying 
a real wage  that is a smooth version of the equilibrium spot market wage 
process.  (See,  for example,  Abowd  and Card, 1987). A different class of 
models  regards the  data as  the  outcome  of  a noncompetitive  game,  in 
which  the wage  is determined  through bargaining between  workers and 
employers,  and employment  is determined by a labor demand  curve, or, 
equivalently,  by an Euler equation. For example, Fisher (1977) and Taylor 
(1980) proposed  models  in  which  nominal  wages  are  fixed  by  labor 
contracts,  and  Ashenfelter  and  Card  (1982) developed  the  time-series 
implications of Taylor's model.  Another possibility is a monopoly  union 
model, in which the wage is set to maximize the utility of the current group 
of union  members.  Such models  have recently been proposed  by Blanch- 
ard  and  Summers  (1986),  and  by  Pencavel  (1987).  A  version  of  the 
Blanchard-Summers model will be estimated in Section 5 below. 
The  other important aspect  of labor market equilibrium which  is  not 
analyzed  here  concerns  the  distinction  between  the  extensive  and  the 
intensive  margin of labor supply.  As  was  shown  in Table 1 above,  the 
variability in total hours worked in U.S. manufacturing comes mostly from 
variability in the number of workers employed,  rather than from average 
hours per worker. This has led to some spirited criticism of representative 
worker models  by Coleman  (1987), Heckman  (1984), Heckman  and Ma- 
Curdy  (1988),  and  MaCurdy  (1987). As  MaCurdy  (1987) explains,  for 
example,  the  wage  offers rejected by  unemployed  workers  are not  ob- 
served,  and yet variability of these wage  offers is a potentially important 
part of the explanation of observed variations in employment. 
In defense  of the representative worker model that is used in this paper, 
there is reason to doubt the empirical relevance of the extensive  margin in 
regard to cyclical labor supply movements.  First, as was mentioned  above, 
Table 1 shows  the variability of hours and employment  for five countries, 
and in three of these  the variability of total hours is far greater than the 
variability of employment.  Second,  the distinction between  the intensive 
and  the extensive  margin of labor supply  depends  crucially on whether 
leisure is perfectly substitutable across periods. Decomposing  the standard 
deviation of total hours worked into employment and average hours pieces 
is  not  a good  way  to  tell whether  the  typical worker  is  at the  interior 
solution  of a utility maximization problem.  If a change  of 20 percent in 
annual  hours  is  common  at the  individual  level,  as  is  argued  by  Card 
(1987), it must surely be common for workers to be without a job at certain 
times, and working 55 hour weeks  at other times. Workers might well be 
indifferent to the choice of working  5 weeks  at 40 hours  per week,  or 4 
weeks at 50 hours, with a week off, or of working a 5-day week for 6 weeks, 172 ?  KENNAN 
as opposed  to a 6-day week for 5 weeks, with a week off. In this light, large 
variations  in  the  number  of  workers  employed  do  not  invalidate  the 
representative agent model  of aggregate labor supply.  At any given  time 
some workers will be without a job, but this does not mean that their utility 
maximization problem has to be given special treatment.9 
In what  follows  I will assume  that the supply  of labor can be approxi- 
mated by a representative worker model,  while  acknowledging  that the 
empirical adequacy of this approximation is an open question. 
3.1 PREFERENCES 
Workers maximize an expected lifetime utility function of the form 
00 
U  =  E I  RtUt[c(t), n(t), n(t  -  1)]  (3.1) 
t=l 
where R is a time preference factor, c(t) and n(t) denote consumption  and 
hours worked in period t, and the function Ut is defined by 
Ut[J] =  c(t)  -  1/2{gs  +  (l+R)Ks}n(t)2  +  Ksn(t)n(t-l)  -  v,(t)n(t) 
gs +  (I+R)K  >  0  (3.2) 
Here gs and Ks  are parameters and vs(t)  represents a random disturbance in 
the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  consumption  and  leisure.  I 
assume  that vs(t) has zero mean, with the understanding  that all variables 
will be measured as deviations from trend. 
Utility is linear in consumption,  so if leisure is held fixed, workers will 
care  only  about  the  expected  present  value  of  lifetime  consumption, 
without  regard to the distribution of consumption  over time. In addition, 
the MRS between  consumption  and leisure depends  only  on  leisure,  so 
real-wage changes have no income effects on labor supply.  This feature is 
attractive from a technical point  of view  because  it allows  a closed-form 
solution  for the  model.  On  the  other  hand,  a backward-bending  labor 
supply curve is ruled out. 
The expected marginal utility of leisure in period t (which is also the MRS 
between  consumption  and leisure) is given by 
MU,  =  g,n(t)  +  K, {An(t)  -  REtn(t  +  1)} +  v,(t).  (3.3) 
9. As in the analysis of Hall and Lilien (1979), if workers have flat indifference curves for these 
alternatives, and if the real shocks impinge mainly on the demand side of the labor market, 
then it is efficient to give employers  the right to vary work schedules  at fixed wages. Employment  and  Real  Wages  *  173 
where An(t) means n(t) -  n(t -  1). Thus MUe is an increasing function of 
current employment,  and an increasing function of steady-state employ- 
ment if g, is positive.  If K,  is negative,  as was assumed  by Sargent (1979), 
then MUe also increases with n(t -  1) and Etn(t +  1), so that current leisure 
and leisure in adjacent periods are substitutes. A positive value of K,  is also 
plausible. 
3.2 TECHNOLOGY 
The production  function is quadratic, with  adjustment costs on  employ- 
ment: 
q(t) =  vd(t)n(t)  -  (llk)  1/2[(-gd)n  (t)2 +  Kd{n(t) -  n(t  -  1)}2]  (3.4) 
Here q and k denote output and capital, -gd  and Kd  are positive parameters, 
and  vd(t) represents  a  zero-mean  random  disturbance  in  the  marginal 
product  of  labor. The  technology  has  constant  returns  to  scale: if n(t), 
n(t -  1) and k are all doubled,  then output also doubles. 
3.3 COMPETITIVE  EQUILIBRIUM 
The competitive equilibrium for the labor market can be found by solving 
a planning  problem in which  the representative worker's utility is maxi- 
mized,  given  the constraints imposed  by the technology.  Since the tech- 
nology has constant returns, the planner need consider only the aggregate 
production function, without regard to the organization of firms. The units 
of capital are chosen  so that there is one unit of capital for each worker in 
the economy.  The representative worker's consumption  is 
c(t)  =  vd(t)n(t)  +  /2gdn(t)2  -  1/2K{n(t)  -  n(t  -  1)}2-  0(t)  (3.5) 
where  o0(t)  units of output are allocated to the owners of capital. When this 
equation is substituted in the utility function, the planning problem can be 
written as 
00 
max 9P =  E  ,  Rt2t[n(t),  n(t  -  1)]  (3.6) 
n(t)  t=l 
where 
t[']  [vd(t)  -  vs(t)]n (t)  -  Y2[g, -  gd  +  (1  +  R)(K, +  Kd)]n(t)2 
+  [K, +  Kd]n(t)n(t  -  1)  (3.7) 
To ensure that this maximization problem is well-defined,  it is necessary to 
assume  (for reasons discussed  in Kennan,  1988) 174  KENNAN 
00 
E  Rt[vd(t) -  V(t)]2 <  , 
t=l 
and 
gs  -  gd  +  (1  +  R)(K,  +  Kd)  >  2 VR|K,  +  Kdl  (3.8) 
The Euler equation for the planning problem is 
Vd(t) +  gdn(t)  -  KdAn(t) +  KdREtAn(t  +  1) =  vs(t) +  gsn(t)  +  KsAn(t) 
-  KsREtAn(t +  1)  (3.9) 
The left side of this equation is the marginal product of labor, and the 
right side is the MRS between  consumption  and leisure. The equilibrium 
stochastic process for employment  makes these equal, and their common 
value  defines  a stochastic real-wage  process w(t), which  can be  used  to 
decentralize the solution of the planning problem. That is,10 
w(t)  =  Vd(t) +  gdn(t)  -  Kdn(t)  +  KdREtAn(t  +  1)  (3.10) 
w(t)  =  Vs(t) +  gsn(t)  +  KsAn(t) -  K,REtAn(t +  1)  (3.11) 
3.4 SOLUTION  OF THE  SOCIAL  PLANNING  PROBLEM 
Define w*(t) and n*(t) as the long-run static equilibrium price and quantity 
of labor which  would  emerge if the disturbances remained fixed at their 
current values.  Then, as in Section 2 above, 
Vd(t)  Vt)  gsvd(t) -  gdV,(t) 
n*(  t)  =  w*(t) =  d()  )  (3.12) 
gs  -  gd  gs  -  gd 
The  planning  problem  can  be  solved  as  follows.  First, consider  the 
canonical problem 
10. On the assumption that the real wage is exogenous,  the firm's Euler equation (3.10) can be 
used to estimate the dynamic demand function for labor, replacing Etn(t +  1) by n(t +  1) 
and using  lagged  values  of n(t) as instruments.  This method  was  used  by Pindyck and 
Rotemberg (1983). Alternatively, the worker's Euler equation (3.11) can be used to estimate 
the dynamic supply function, using exactly the same procedure. This method was used by 
Mankiw,  Rotemberg,  and  Summers  (1985). It is clear from the  symmetry  of the  Euler 
equations  that these  two  "alternatives" are in  fact identical,  and  that  Euler equation 
estimates cannot generally identify either the supply or demand parameters. Employment  and  Real  Wages  *  175 
min  C [y(t)2 -  2yy(t)y(t  -  1)  -  2a(t)y(t)], 
y  t=i 
0  y<1/2  (3.13) 
where y(O)  is given.  Define A as the unique number in [0,1) which satisfies 
x 
y  =  (3.14) 
(1 + X2) 
Then, as in Kennan (1988), the solution of the canonical problem is 
y(t) =  Ay(t-  1) + a(t),  t =  1, 2, 3...  (3.15) 
where 
a(t)  =  (1  +  X2) E  i'a(t  +  i), 
i=O 
t =  1, 2, 3 . . .  (3.16) 
The planning problem can be written as 
min E  Rt[12[gs  -  gd  +  (1  +  R)(K  +  Kd)n(t)2 
n(t)  t=l 
-  [Ks  +  Kd]n(t)n(t  -  1)  -  al(t)n(t)]  (3.17) 
where  al(t)  =  vd(t) -  v,(t) =  (gs -  gd)n*(t). This  can  be  reduced  to  the 
canonical form as follows.  First, the discount factor can be hidden and the 
sign of Ks  +  Kd  can be controlled by defining 
o =  viK  +  Kd  y(t)  =  ctn(t)  and  c 2(t)=  wtal(t).  (3.18) 
|KS +  Kd| 
This transformation converts the planning problem to 
min  E  [/2{gs  -  gd  +  (1  +  R)(KS  +  Kd)}y(t)2 
y(t)  t=1 
-  V/RIK +  Kdly(t)Y(t  -  1)  -  a2(t)y(t)]  (3.19) 176- KENNAN 
Now  divide  by  1/2{g -  gd +  (1 +  R)(K, +  Kd)} to  obtain  the  canonical 
problem, where 
IKS +  Kdl 
' =V'R  ,and 
gs  -  gd  +  (1  +  R)(KS +  Kd) 
a2(t) 
a(t)  =  2(t)  (3.20) 
gs  - 
gd  +  (1  +  R)(Ks +  Kd) 
The solution, using a simple certainty-equivalence argument from Kennan 
(1988), is given by 
n(t) =  In(t  -  1) +  (1 -  i)n?(t),  t =  1, 2, 3...  (3.21) 
where  /  =  A/w  is an optimal adjustment coefficient, and nO(t)  is an "ideal" 
current employment  level, which is defined by 
n?(t) =  (1  -  /R)  E  iL'RiEtn*(t +  i)  (3.22) 
i=O 
The equilibrium real wage can be found by substituting the equilibrium 
employment  path into the Euler equation, to obtain 
w(t)  =  gn(t)  +  w*(t)  -  gn*(t)  (3.23) 
where 
g =  Xgd +  (1  -  X)gs,  X =  Ks/(Kd  +  K,)  (3.24) 
3.5 DYNAMIC SUPPLY AND  DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
The competitive  equilibrium decentralizes the planner's Pareto optimum 
by  having  workers  and  firms maximize  expected  discounted  utility and 
profits,  using  the  discount  factor R,  and  taking  the  real-wage  w(t)  as 
given.1l  Both  the  worker's  and  firm's problems  can be  represented  by 
11. The solution  of the planner's  problem  is unique,  so the equilibrium  value of the marginal 
product  of labor,  wl(t),  is unique.  The  decentralizing  wage is not unique,  in the sense that 
workers  could  be paid a random  bonus in arrears,  but the difference  w(t) -  w1(t)  must be 
white noise, orthogonal  to w1(t).  This  means  that  the variance  of w(t)  must be larger  than 
the variance  of wl(t). It may be, however,  that the serial  correlation  properties  of w(t)  are 
different  from  those of w1(t):  for  example,  if w1(t)  is AR(1),  then  w(t)  would be ARMA(1,1). Employment  and Real Wages  ?  177 
quadratic partial adjustment models with stochastic targets driven by w(t). 
The profit maximization problem for each firm is 
00 
max  E  E  Rt[q(t)  -  w(t)n(t)]  (3.25) 
n(t)  t=1 
where 
q(t)  =  vd(t)n(t)  +  1/2gdn  (t)2  -  2Kd {n(t)  -  n  (t  -  1)}2  (3.26) 
This can be written as 
00 
min  E > Rt[4d{n(t)  -  n5d(t)}2  +  ld{n(t)  -  n(t  -  1)}2]  (3.27) 
n(t)  t=1 
where 
w(t)  =  gdnd*(t)  +  Vd(t)  (3.28) 
cPd  =  (1  -  d)(l  -  R  d),  WPd  /l,d  =  -gdlKd  0 <  lud  <  1.  (3.29) 
This is a version of Sargent's (1981) labor demand model. Equation (3.28) is 
a static labor demand curve which would hold in the absence of adjustment 
costs. The dynamic demand  function is a partial adjustment rule 
nd(t)  =  Ldnd(t  -  1)  +  (1  -  /Xd)(1 -  IUdR) E  p~Ri'Ednd(t +  i)  (3.30) 
i=l 
The worker's problem can be written as 
Still, the persistence of w(t) must be less than the persistence of w1(t), in the sense that the 
spectrum is flatter, since the spectrum of w is an average of two pieces, one being perfectly 
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min  E  E  Rt [s  {n(t)  -  n* (t)}2  +  /s  {n(t) -  n(t  -  1)}2]  (3.31) 
n(t)  t=1 
where 
w(t)  =  gsn* (t)  +  vs (t)  (3.32) 
Os =  (1  -  ,s)(1  -  RpXs),  ksl,/s  =  gs!Ks,  I\VR /s  <  1.  (3.33) 
The coefficient sL  is negative if Ks  is negative, but 0s is always positive. If the 
utility  function  is  temporally  separable  (Ks =  0)  then  labor  supply  is 
governed  by  the  static supply  curve  (3.32). If /L is  negative,  the  actual 
supply  of labor will be more variable than is indicated by equation (3.32). 
The dynamic labor supply function is a partial adjustment rule 
ns(t) =  -sns (t  -  1)  +  (1  -  pxs)(l -  ps5R)  usR'Etns(t +  i)  (3.34) 
i=O 
The  structural model  is  summarized  by  the  symmetric pair of  partial 
adjustment rules (3.30) and (3.34). The basic parameters are the adjustment 
coefficients  /us and  /d,  and the  slope  coefficients g,  and gd. The reduced 
form is given by equation (3.23) and the partial adjustment rule (3.21). 
4. A Monopoly  Union  with  Precommitment 
The  structural interpretation of  employment  and  real-wage  movements 
presented  above  involves  a  standard  dynamic  labor demand  function, 
derived  from a model  of  profit maximization with  adjustment  costs  on 
employment,  and  a less  familiar labor supply  function,  which  interacts 
with the demand  function to determine a market-clearing equilibrium. In 
this section I will analyze a model  in which  a powerful  national union  is 
assumed  to commit to a sequence  of contingent  plans for future wages, 
while  firms choose  employment  according to the same dynamic demand 
function  used  in  the  previous  section.  Although  realized  wages  will 
depend  on future disturbances, they must do so according to a functional 
relationship which is announced  in advance.12 
12. There  are  two  reasons  for assuming  precommitment,  rather than  assuming  that  the 
union's  policy  must  be  time-consistent.  The first reason,  which  is not decisive,  is that 
precommitment makes the union more powerful, and thus provides a sharper contrast to 
the competitive model. The second reason is that I have not yet solved the time-consistent 
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Suppose that the union can precommit to a sequence of contingent plans 
for employment  at all future dates, where n(t) can depend  on the realiza- 
tions  of the  preference shocks  vs(r) and the technology  shocks  Vd(r), for 
T <  t. The plan for period t can be varied independently  of the plans for the 
other periods. The firm must be induced to go along with these plans, by 
establishing  the right stochastic process  for wages.  This can be done  by 
consulting  the firm's Euler equation: 
w(t) =  vd(t) + gdn(t) -  KdAn(t)  +  KdREtAn(t  +  1)  (4.1) 
The optimal choice for the union can be found by substituting w(t)n(t) for 
c(t) in the utility function, using the value of w(t) given by the firm's Euler 
equation. The full effect of changing n(t) is shown by multiplying equation 
(4.1) by n(t) and lagging and leading one period: 
c(t  -  1)  =  Vd(t -  1)n(t  -  1)  +  gdn(t -  1)2 -  Kdn(t -  1)an(t  -  1) 
+  KdRn(t  -  1)Et_,An(t)  (4.2) 
c(t)  =  vd(t)n(t)  +  gdn(t)  -  Kdn(t)An(t) +  KdRn(t)EtAn(t  +  1)  (4.3) 
c(t  +  1)  =  vd(t  +  1)n(t  +  1)  +  gdn(t  +  1)2 -  Kdn(t +  1)An(t  +  1) 
+  KdRn(t +  1)Et+iAn(t +  2)  (4.4) 
Equation  (4.2)  shows  that  the  employment  level  chosen  in  period  t 
influences  the wage  in the previous  period.  The essential  feature of the 
precommitment  model is that the union can exploit this link between  the 
present and the past.13 
The time-inconsistent  monopoly  union's  maximization problem can be 
obtained by using equation (4.2) to substitute for c(t) in the utility function. 
It is convenient  to shift the last term in equations (4.2) to (4.4) forward by 
one period. The problem can then be stated as 
max A  =  E  E  Rt{t[n(t),n(t  -  1)]  (4.5) 
n(t)  t=1 
13. By making an analogy to a similar model by Hansen,  Epple, and Roberds (1985), I guess 
that the time-consistent monopoly  problem can be analyzed by assuming  that the union 
ignores the link between  n(t) and c(t -  1) shown  in equation (4.2), while  exploiting the 
links between  n(t) and c(t) and c(t +  1) shown in equations (4.3) and (4.4). This introduces 
an asymmetry  that makes the solution  of the union's  problem  much more difficult. 180 ?  KENNAN 
where 
Att  ]  =  [vd(t)  -  v,(t)]  n(t)  -  V2[g,  -  2gd  +  (1  +  R)(K,  +  2Kd In  (t)2 
+  [K, +  2K d]n (t)n(t  -  1)  (4.6) 
To ensure that this problem is well-defined,  it is necessary to assume 
gs  -  2gd  +  (1  +  R)(Ks  +  2Kd) >  2VR  IK, +  2Kdl 
Define  w*(t)  and  n  *(t)  as  the  long-run  static equilibrium  price  and 
quantity of labor that would  emerge if the trend and disturbance variables 
remained fixed at their current values.  Then 
n  d(t)  -  v  s(t  )  wV)  (gs  -  gd)vd(t)  -  gdvs(t) 
n*(t)  =  w*(t)  (4.7) 
gs  -  2gd  gs  -  2gd 
The monopoly  problem is essentially  the  same  as the  social planning 
problem, with a redefinition of parameters. Thus, the monopoly union can 
find  out  how  to  set  employment  by  asking  the  social planner what  he 
would  do  if  the  parameter g,  were  replaced by gs -  gd and  if  Ks were 
replaced by Ks +  Kd. The answer is that he would use n*(t) instead of n*(t) 
as the static employment  target, and also that he would  change the speed 
of adjustment. 
The Euler equation for the union's problem is 
vd(t) +  2gdn(t)  -  2KdAn(t) +  2KdREtAn(t +  1) =  v,(t)  +  gsn(t)  +  Ks,n(t) 
-  K,REtAn(t +  1)  (4.8) 
The left side of this equation is the marginal revenue curve derived from 
the  labor  demand  function,  and  the  right  side  is  the  MRS between 
consumption  and leisure. 
To compare the speed  of adjustment in the competitive and monopoly 
models,  first note that the value of y in the monopoly  model is 
Ks  +  2KdI 
3'm =  M'R  (4.9) 
gs  -  2gd  +  (1  +  R)(Ks  +  2Kd) 
If Ks =  0, then  y,  is larger than y, and this implies that the adjustment 
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when  the union runs the market there is more persistence in employment 
than  when  the  social  planner  runs  it.  This  is  true  even  though  the 
membership  effects emphasized  by  Blanchard-Summers have  been  sup- 
pressed here. 
These results must hold over some range of Ks  close to zero. At the other 
extreme, if Kd  is zero, then ym is smaller than y, so ]Lm  must be closer to zero 
than ,u. 
4.1 THE  MONOPOLY  WAGE 
Given the employment  path chosen  by the union,  the wage  path can be 
inferred from the firm's Euler equation, which is 
w(t)  =  vd(t) +  gdn(t)  +  Kd[n(t -  1)  -  (1 +  R)n(t)  +  REtn(t +  1)]  (4.10) 
Compare this with the union's Euler equation: 
0  =  [Vd(t) -  v,(t)]  +  (2gd -  g)n(t) 
+  (2Kd +  K,)[n(t -  1) -  (1 +  R)n(t)  +  REtn(t +  1)]  (4.11) 
Now use these two equations to eliminate [n(t -  1) +  REtn(t +  1)], leaving 
an expression which  determines w(t) from the union's policy for n(t). 
(2Kd +  K,)W(t)  =  (2Kd +  K,)Vd(t) +  (2Kd +  K,)gdn(t) 
+  (2Kd +  Ks)Kd[n(t  -  1) -  (1  +  R)n(t) 
+  REtn(t +  1)]  (4.12) 
0  =  Kd[Vd(t) -  v(t)]  +  Kd(2gd -  gs)n(t) 
+  (2Kd +  KS)Kd[n(t -  1) -  (1 +  R)n(t)  +  REtn(t +  1)]  (4.13) 
(2Kd +  K,)W(t)  =  (Kd +  K,)Vd(t) +  Kdvs(t) +  (Ksgd  +  Kdgs)n(t)  (4.14) 
This can be written as 
w(t)  =  gmn(t) +  w*(t)  -  gmn*(t)  (4.15) 
where 
K,  +  Kd 
gm  =  Xmgd  +  (1  -  Xm)(gs 
- 
gd),  Xm  K  (4.16) 
2Kd  +  K, 
So the monopolist  sets both wages  and employment  as a social planner 
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were  K,  +  Kd.  Thus, the monopoly  and competitive outcomes appear to be 
equivalent, and can be distinguished only by asking which interpretation of 
the parameter estimates is more plausible. Since the monopoly  model says 
that the true supply curve is flatter than that inferred from the competitive 
model,  and  since  the  competitive  model  is in trouble largely because  it 
makes the supply curve too flat, things do not look good for the monopoly 
interpretation.14 
5. Empirical  Implementation  of the  Equilibrium  Models 
To implement  the  competitive  and  monopoly  models  it is  necessary  to 
make  specific assumptions  about the  supply  and  demand  disturbances. 
The theoretical discussion in Section 3 referred to v,(t) and vd(t)  as shocks to 
preferences and technology.  The empirical version of the model, however, 
must allow v,(t) and vd(t) to stand for the list of unmeasured variables that 
influence  labor supply  and  demand.  In the  case  of  the  empirical work 
reported  below,  this  is  necessarily  a  long  list  (since  its  complement  is 
empty).  In defense  of  this  work,  it seems  that there is  little chance  of 
building realistic equilibrium models  of the labor market unless  the inter- 
actions of dynamic labor supply and demand functions can first be sorted 
out in a highly  simplified context. 
Suppose first that the disturbances vs and vd are white noise. Then n*, w* 
and no are also white noise,  and the equilibrium for employment  and real 
wages  is a restricted VAR(1), given by 
n(t) =  ,i n(t -  1) +  4  n*(t)  (5.1) 
w(t) = glu n(t -  1) +  (g4  -  1) n*(t) +  w*(t)  (5.2) 
In this case serial correlation in real wages  is fully explained  by  serial 
correlation in employment:  the real wage  is not a state variable. As was 
shown  in Table 2 above, this has no chance of fitting the data. 
Suppose  then that the supply and demand shocks are AR(1) processes: 
vs(t)  =  pVs(t  -  1)  +  77(t),  -1  <  Ps <  1  (5.3) 
Vd(t) =  Pdvd(t -  1) +  7d(t),  -1  <  Pd <  1  (5.4) 
14. Robert Hall pointed  out to me  that the results are very sensitive  to the linearity of the 
supply and demand curves. For example, suppose  that the marginal utility of leisure is a 
loglinear function of hours worked,  and the marginal product of labor is also loglinear. 
Then in the static version of the monopoly model, vertical shifts in the demand curve trace 
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where  qj(t)  [rlq(t)  rqd(t)]'  is an innovation vector such that 
E  qj(t) r1(t)' =  I,  E  q(t) 7q(T)' =  0,  t f  T.  (5.5) 
Then from equations (3.21) and (3.23) 
n(t)  =  At n(t  -  1)  +  vs(t)  +  Vt(t)  (5.6) 
Ks  +  Kd  1  -  Rups  1 -  R  Ap, 
1 
w(t)  =  g n(t)  +  [Kd  v,(t)  +  Ks Vd(t)I  (5.7) 
K5  +  Kd 
These equations can be written in matrix form as 
F y(t)  =  Jy(t  -  1) +  Tv(t)  (5.8) 
where y(t) is the vector [n(t) w(t)]', v(t) is [v,(t) vd(t)],  and 
1  0  ts  td  0- 
F  (Ks  +  Kd)T  d  (59) 
g  -1  Kd -  Ks  0  0 
tR  td  -  (5.10) 
1  -  RAps  1  -  R I?Pd 
The VAR for employment  and real wages  is derived as 
FT(I -  CL) T  1(F -  JL) y(t)  =  FT(I -  CL) v(t)  =  FT  q(t)  e(t),  (5.11) 
where  L is the lag operator, C  diag(p,,pd), and FE =  I. That is, 
y(t) = A y(t -  1) +  B y(t -  2) +  8(t),  (5.12) 
where 
A  =  FTCT 1F + FJ and  B  -FTCT-1J.  (5.13) 
The second  column of B is zero (since the second column of J  is zero), so 
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The VAR has three nonzero  roots,15 which  match the serial correlation 
parameters p, and  Pd, and  the market adjustment  coefficient ,/,  but  one 
cannot tell which root is ps, which is Pd  and which is /u. On the assumption 
that the three roots are distinct, the VAR coefficients in A and  B can be 
used, as in Kennan (1988), to identify the three supply parameters is5,  hs, ps, 
and the three demand parameters Pd, hd, pd. This gives estimates with large 
standard errors, and further analysis of the likelihood function is needed  to 
determine  whether  there  is  a  set  of  structural parameters,  which  is 
plausible a priori,  and which could have generated the data. This issue will 
be discussed  further after the VAR estimates have been presented. 
5.1 VAR  ESTIMATES 
Table 4  shows  VAR estimates  for hours  worked  and  real wages  (CPI- 
deflated), with both variables measured in logs, and with linear trends and 
deterministic seasonals included in each equation. There is no uniformity 
of results. At one extreme, the VAR(2) model gives a good approximation 
to  the  U.K.  data,  relative to a VAR(12), while  at the  other extreme  the 
VAR(2) model  fits the Japanese data very badly, and in fact even  twelve 
lags are not enough to dispose of the serial correlation in the hours equation 
for  Japan.  Given  the  VAR(2)  approximation,  w(t -  2)  can  always  be 
excluded from the real-wage equation, but it is sometimes significant in the 
employment  equation. 
The VAR(2) model  clearly does  not allow a general explanation of the 
dynamics of employment  and real wages.  It may be that more complicated 
models,  which allow employment  decisions to interact with inventory and 
capital accumulation decisions, would capture some of the omitted dynam- 
ics. Yet, even though  the simple VAR(2) model is not generally sufficient, 
it is also true that a more complicated model is not always  necessary.  In 
particular, the  U.K.  hours  variable seems  to  follow  a simple  univariate 
AR(1) process,  which is close to a random walk. 
In what  follows,  I will treat the VAR(2) model  as an admittedly rough 
approximation, and use it to explore possible structural  explanations for the 
second  moments  of the data, including the auto- and cross-covariances of 
employment  and real wages.  Since the structural model  discussed  above 
refers to the levels of employment  and real wages,  rather than the logs of 
these  variables,  the  following  estimates  are based  on  data expressed  in 
index form (each series was  divided  by its sample mean,  without  taking 
logs).  Table 5  shows  detailed  VAR(2) results,  which  are similar to  the 
logarithmic results in Table 4. The exclusion restriction on w(t -  2) is tested 
15. The fourth root of the VAR is zero because of the restriction that the second column of B 
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Table 4  VAR(2) AND  VAR(12) MODELS 
Denmark  Canada  Japan  U.K.  U.S. 
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.109 Table 5  UNRESTRICTED  AND  RESTRICTED  VAR(2) MODELS 
VAR coefficients  (standard  errors) 
Hours  Worked Equation  Real Wage Equation  Roots 
n(-1)  n(-2)  w(-1)  w(-2)  n(-1)  n(-2)  w(-1)  w(-2)  1  2  3  4 
.752  .238  -.080  .072  .026  -.011  .968  .025  .992  .992  -.029  -.235 
(.045)  (.045)  (.097)  (.097)  (.021)  (.021)  (.046)  (.046) 
w(-2) 
excluded  .752  .237  -.009  .026  -.011  .992  .992  .992 
p=67.2%  (.045)  (.045)  (.014)  (.021)  (.021)  (.007) 
Denmark  .514  .223  .376  -.564  .009  -.051  .840  .100  .979  .725 
(.070)  (.071)  (.260)  (.256)  (.019)  (.020)  (.072)  (.070) 
w(-2) 
excluded  .532  .212  -.181  .006  -.049  .939  .975  .755 
p=3.3%  (.071)  (.072)  (.063)  (.019)  (.020)  (.017) 
Japan  .420  .550  .353  -.415  -.135  .132  1.309  -.333  .983  .971 
(.045)  (.044)  (.093)  (.094)  (.024)  (.023)  (.049)  (.050) 
.000  -.239 
.024  -.373 
.000  -.259 
.271  -.496 
Canada w(-2) 
excluded  .490  .486  -.052 
p=0  (.043)  (.042)  (.017) 
-.079  .081  .98 
(.023)  (.023)  (.009) 
.986  .986  .000  -.497 
.870  .109  .016  -.008  .035  .009  .882  .052  .987  .931  -.056  -.111 
(.062)  (.063)  (.043)  (.043)  (.090)  (.091)  (.062)  (.063) 
w(-2) 
excluded  .870  .109  .008 
p=71.6%  (.062)  (.063)  (.016) 
.036  .008  .929 
(.091)  (.091)  (.023) 
.987  .924 
1.225  -.255  .086  -.065  .017  -.022  .977  .022  .996  .964 
(.044)  (.044)  (.127)  (.127)  (.016)  (.016)  (.046)  (.046) 
w(-2) 
excluded  1.226  -.256  .022 
p=77.6%  (.044)  (.044)  (.011) 
.017  -.022  1.000 
(.016)  (.016)  (.004) 
.996  .964 
.000  -.112 
.270  -.028 
.266  .000 
Explanation:  These  estimates  are from  VAR(2)  models for  hours  worked  and real  wages, where  both variables  are  expressed  as indices.  Linear  trends  and seasonal  dummies 
were  included  in each  equation.  The p-values  shown in the left column  refer  to a likelihood  ratio  test of the restriction  that  w(t-2)  does not enter  either  equation  of the VAR. 
For  example,  the data  for Denmark  just reject  this restriction  at a significance  level of 3.3%. 
UK 
US 188  KENNAN 
and easily accepted for three of the five countries, but strongly rejected for 
Japan (the p-values of a  2 test are shown  in the table). 
Table  5  also  shows  the  characteristic roots  of  the  unrestricted  and 
restricted VAR(2) models  for each  country.  In all cases  two  roots  were 
found  near  the  unit  circle,16 and  the  next  root  was  generally  small  in 
magnitude,  and negative in sign. This pattern is not easily explained by the 
model discussed  above. One possibility is to account for the two big roots 
by assuming that the shocks v,(t) and vd(t) follow the same autoregression, 
so that Ps =  Pd =  p. In this case A =  C +  FJ  and B =  -CFJ, and the VAR 
can be written as 
n(t)  -  pn(t  -  1)=  -[n(t  -  1) -  pn(t  -  2)]  +  en(t)  (5.14) 
w(t)  -  pw(t  -  1) =  gu[n(t  -  1) -  pn(t  -  2)]  +  Ew(t)  (5.15) 
where the parameters ,/ and g may come from either the competitive or the 
monopoly  union  model.  This gives  an implausible  interpretation of  the 
data, however,  since the adjustment coefficient Au  (which is the third root of 
the VAR) will generally be negative. 
An alternative interpretation, which gives promising results for the U.K. 
data,  is  shown  in Table 6.  The two  big roots are assigned  to  ,I and  ps, 
meaning  that preference shocks are very persistent, the market is slow to 
adjust  employment,  and  there  is  not  much  persistence  in  the  demand 
shocks. The supply shock is small relative to the demand shock, and there 
is negative correlation between  the innovations  rls(t)  and rlq(t).  The adjust- 
ment  costs  on  the demand  side  are high,  so  the employers'  adjustment 
coefficient Id  is about .95 (per month). The implications of this configura- 
tion will be illustrated by applying the dynamic model to the data on hours 
worked and real wages  earned for the U.S. and the U.K. 
Table 6 shows restricted maximum likelihood estimates corresponding to 
various assumptions  about the structural parameters. The main question is 
whether or not plausible supply and demand elasticities can be found that 
fit the data, without violating the assumption that most of the variation in 
employment  comes  from the demand  shocks. For the U.S.,  the answer is 
clearly  no,  as  one  would  have  expected.  For  the  U.K.,  however,  a 
remarkably good  fit is obtained with a relatively inelastic supply  curve, a 
unit-elastic demand  curve,  and  supply  shocks which  explain at most  26 
16. Where  two equal  roots  are shown, they represent  a complex  pair.  The imaginary  parts  of 
these roots were of trivial  magnitude  in each instance,  so the numbers  shown represent 
both the real  parts  and the moduli, to three  digits. Table 6  STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATIONS  OF U.S.  AND  UK HOURS AND  REAL WAGES 
VAR coefficients  (standard  errors) 
Hours Worked Eq"  Real Wage Eq"  Innovations 
n(-l)  n(-2)  w(-1)  n(-l)  n(-2)  w(-)  se(n)  se(w)  corr  x  (3) 
















1.278  -0.311  -0.052  0.003  -0.007  0.970  .0126  .0044  .256 
se  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.013) 
1.240  -0.271  -0.021  0.021  -0.026  0.973  .0125  .0046  .288  3.24 
1.215  -0.247  -0.022  0.034  -0.039  0.973  .0124  .0047  .309  8.27 
1.184  -0.217  -0.023  0.050  -0.056  0.973  .0122  .0049  .332  18.27 
1.108  -0.146  -0.027  0.103  -0.111  0.971  .0118  .0057  .376  77.35 
1.028  -0.081  -0.040  0.252  -0.277  0.953  .0113  .0090  .380  297.25 
1.040  -0.118  -0.063  0.562  -0.639  0.893  .0112  .0156  .306  601.05 
1.228  -0.258  0.021  0.016  -0.020  1.000  .0130  .0050  .056 
se  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.004) 
1.241  -0.257  -0.008  0.016  -0.019  0.998  .0130  .0049  .041  6.91 
1.237  -0.252  -0.008  0.020  -0.024  0.998  .0130  .0049  .050  6.95 
1.202  -0.217  -0.007  0.041  -0.045  0.998  .0128  .0050  .094  12.10 
1.154  -0.169  -0.007  0.074  -0.078  0.997  .0125  .0053  .156  36.10 
0.886  0.088  0.005  0.042  0.001  0.931  .0115  .0163  .010 
se  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.016)  (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.023) 
-0.121  0.940  .0112  .0171  .098  6.36  =-.75  0.836  0.137  -0.006  0.165 Structural  Parameters 
.  fs  Ks  s  Uas  Ps  (d 
U.S.  1948-71 
Unconstrained  .939  6.97  .083  .292  .0045  .981  -2.2 
.949  4.  .083  .207  .0051  .980  -1.0 
.949  3.5  .058  .147  .0052  .981  -1.0 
.948  3.  .028  .073  .0054  .981  -1.0 
.940  2.  -.054  -.14  .0062  .983  -1.0 
.898  1.  -.240  -.66  .0099  .984  -1.0 
.754  0.5  -.564  .0191  .982  -1.0 
Kd  tld  o0d  Pd  r  R 
141.72  .947  1.310  .328  -.29  .10 
420.25  .955  4.019  .284  -.5  .26 
421.32  .955  4.117  .259  -.5  .26 
424.66  .955  4.261  .228  -.5  .26 
357.83  .951  3.806  .156  -.5  .26 
164.57  .927  1.853  .100  -.5  .28 
37.34  .851  0.432  .197  -.5  .36 
U.S.  1948-86 
Unconstrained  .963  6.64  .034  .159  .0053  .997  0.7  -757.0  .961  7.587  .268  +.41  .16 
.977  6  .042  .174  .0054  1.000  -0.5  3352.9  .978  33.205  .262  -.44  .19 
.978  5  .048  .167  .0056  1.000  -0.5  3560.7  .979  35.385  .257  -.5  .25 
.979  4  .015  .053  .0057  1.000  -0.5  3912.2  .980  40.054  .222  -.5  .25 
.979  3  -.032  -.121  .0060  .999  -0.5  4211.5  .981  44.825  .172  -.5  .25% 
UK 1953-83 
Unconstrained  .927  -.10  0.746  -.09  .1051  .980  0.5  -1892.9  .972  24.19  -.090  -.99  .98 
.970  0.75  -0.246  -.32  .0197  .945  -1.0  2129.2  .981  27.67  -.139  -.5  .26 
Explanation:  A VAR(2) model,  with w(t-2)  excluded,  was estimated  using  seasonally  unadjusted  monthly  data for hours worked and CPI-deflated straight-time  wages  for 
U.S.  manufacturing.  Both variables were  divided  by  their sample  means,  and both equations  included  seasonal  dummies  and a linear trend.  The roots of  the  VAR are 
interpreted as the market adjustment  coefficient,  A, and the serial correlation coefficients p, and p, of the supply  and demand  shocks.  The parameters w, and  Ad  are the 
adjustment coefficients of the dynamic supply and demand functions,  and  s,  and  d are approximate elasticities of supply and demand.  The standard errors of the innovations 
in the supply  and demand  shocks  are os  and  crd, and the correlation of these  innovations  is r. 
The structural parameters for the constrained model were chosen  to maximize the likelihood function, while keeping  the elasticities at the values shown,  and ensuring  that 
the demand shock is much more variable than the demand  shock.  The proportion of the variance in employment  innovations  explained by the supply  shock  innovation  is 
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percent of the variation in employment.  The genesis of these results will be 
briefly discussed. 
The estimates in Table 6 are based on the VAR(2) model with w(t -  2) 
excluded,  which  is  the  reduced  form of the  structural model  discussed 
above. If the innovation vector r(t) is assumed  to be Gaussian, maximum 
likelihood  estimates  of the VAR(2) coefficients can be computed  by least 
squares regression. These unrestricted estimates are shown  at the head of 
each panel in Table 6, along with the associated standard deviations  and 
correlation coefficient for the estimated  innovations  in employment  and 
real wages.  Next,  the likelihood is explored  as a function  of the  supply 
elasticity  5s, while  maintaining  a  fixed  demand  elasticity  (either  -1  or 
-0.5),  and restricting the influence of the labor supply  shock on employ- 
ment.  The  latter restriction is  accomplished  by  holding  the  correlation 
coefficient of -s(t) and 77d(t)  above -.5,  and the proportion of the variance 
in employment  innovations  explained by the supply  shock innovation  is 
shown  in  Table 6  as  R2. Given  these  three  restrictions,  the  likelihood 
function is maximized with respect to the six remaining structural param- 
eters  (Ks, ps,  Kd,  Pd,  as,  cd),  and  the  likelihood  ratio test  of  the  three 
restrictions is shown  in the column labeled  2(3). 
Two sets of estimates are shown in Table 6 for the U.S. data: one for the 
full  sample  period,  and  one  for the  period  1948-1971,  for purposes  of 
comparison  with  the results in Neftci (1978), Sargent (1981) and Kennan 
(1988). In each case,  an implausibly large supply  elasticity (at least 4) is 
needed  in order to pass the likelihood ratio test. 
The U.K. data, on the other hand,  pass the likelihood ratio test with a 
range of plausible values for the supply  elasticity. The lower limit of this 
range is roughly .75, and the estimates for this value are shown  in Table 6. 
The observed serial correlation in employment  and real wages is attributed 
to persistent (though small) labor supply shocks,  and to large adjustment 
costs  on  the  demand  side  of the labor market. There is not much  serial 
correlation in the labor demand shocks, and the adjustment coefficient on 
the supply side is negative, indicating that leisure this month is a substitute 
for leisure next month. 
The big surprise in Table 6 is that cyclical variation in the real wage  is 
unimportant. It is widely believed that alternative theoretical models of the 
business  cycle can be tested against the "stylized fact" that the real wage is 
neither strongly procyclical nor strongly countercyclical.17  The estimates in 
Tables 1, 2 and  4 above  confirm that the  stylized  fact is  generally  true 
suggesting  in particular  that an equilibrium model driven by labor demand 
shocks  cannot be expected  to fit the data. Indeed,  if the model  is driven 
17. See, for example,  the Barro-King  quote at the start of this paper. 192 *  KENNAN 
exclusively  by  labor demand  shocks,  then  the  predicted  correlation be- 
tween the employment  and real wage innovations is + 1. But the estimates 
in Table 6 show  that this prediction is not robust when  small labor supply 
shocks are admitted. There is some ambiguity here since the innovations m7 
and 'q  in the labor supply and demand shocks are negatively correlated, so 
that even though  ro-  (the standard deviation of mr)  is tiny relative to da,  the 
influence of r, is not negligible. But even under the conservative assump- 
tion that all of the covariation between  mr  and  d1 is included  under  the 
heading  of labor supply  shocks,  the influence  of labor supply  shocks on 
employment  is still small. In other words, the employment innovation  En is 
a linear combination of r7,  and 7d, and when  En  is regressed on  7sq,  the R2  is 
.26,  meaning  that  about  74 percent  of  the  variation in  employment  is 
unambiguously  due to demand shocks.18 
Although  the  dynamic  model  can  easily  accommodate  acyclical real 
wages,  it cannot explain the other major "stylized fact":  employment varies 
more than real wages.  This can be seen in the results for the U.S. data. With 
a supply  elasticity of  .5, for example,  the restricted ML estimate  for the 
1948-71 period leaves more variance in the real wage residual than in the 
employment  residual,  even  though  the  employment  residual has  much 
more variance in the unrestricted ML estimate.  On the other hand,  this 
"stylized  fact" is  not  true  for the  U.K.,  and  so  the  U.K.  data  can  be 
interpreted  as being  largely generated  by  movements  along  a dynamic 
labor supply function, in response to shocks in the dynamic labor demand 
function. 
In summary, both the competitive and the monopoly  union models can 
in principle explain various patterns of serial correlation and cross-correla- 
tion in employment  and real-wage data. In practice, it is difficult to fit the 
data with  a structural parameter set that would  include plausible supply 
and demand elasticities, relatively large demand shocks, and a reasonable 
interpretation of the roots of the VAR. Analysis of the likelihood function 
for the U.K. data did, however, yield a reasonable structural  interpretation. 
A novel feature of these results is that even though supply is inelastic, and 
the model is driven almost entirely by demand shocks, it is not the case that 
there are strong procyclical fluctuations in the real wage. 
18. The sensitivity of the correlation between employment  and real-wage innovations to small 
labor supply  shocks  is analyzed  further in Appendix  A.  The correlation is small when 
there are large adjustment costs on the demand  side,  and not on the supply  side,  and 
when  the supply  shock is persistent and the demand  shock is not. Employment  and Real Wages  193 
5.2 THE  BLANCHARD-SUMMERS  MODEL 
In a simple  version  of  the  hysteresis  model  presented  in  this  space  by 
Blanchard and  Summers  (1986), the  union  sets  wages  so  that expected 
employment  is a weighted  average of a long-run target, r, and n(t -  1). 
Thus, according to their equation (3.2), 
nu(t) =  (1  -  a)r  +  anu(t -  1) +  vu(t)  (5.16) 
where  vu(t) represents  a  random  shock  in  the  unions'  objective,  or  a 
"tremble" in implementing  its policy.19  When the parameter a is close to 1 
there is hysteresis in employment,  meaning that employment  will look like 
an integrated process (as it does in Table 3 above). This is combined with 
the dynamic labor demand  function (3.30) to obtain equilibrium employ- 
ment and real wages. 
If the shocks vu(t)  and vd(t) are AR(1) processes,  the Blanchard-Summers 
model  implies  a  restricted VAR(2) for employment  and  real wages,  in 
which the real wage does not Granger-cause employment,  and w(t -  2) is 
excluded  from the real-wage equation.  This result is derived  as follows. 
Write the firm's Euler equation written as 
w(t)  =  v(t)  +  [g,  -  (1  +  R)Kd]n(t) +  Kdn(t -  1) +  KdREtn(t  +  1)  (5.17) 
Use the union's employment  rule (5.16) to substitute for Etn(t +  1), so that 
w(t)  =  vd(t)  +  KdRpuVu(t) +  [gd  +  RKda -  (1  +  R)Kd]n(t)  +  Kdn(t -  1)  (5.18) 
where p, is the serial correlation coefficient of vu(t). Write equations (5.16) 
and (5.18) as 
Fuy(t) =  Juy(t -  1)  +  Tuv(t)  (5.19) 
1  0  1  0  a  0 
Fu  =  Td  =  .  (5.20) 
f  -1  -KdRpu  -  Kd  0 
19. In Pencavel and Holmlund's  (1987) model the union's objective function depends  on n(t) 
and w(t), and also on w(t -  1), because the union's "aspirations" with regard to the wage 
may depend  on previously established levels of the wage.  An implication of this setup is 
that the real wage becomes a state variable, even when  the disturbances are white noise. 
This is not true in the Blanchard-Summers model, although the two models are otherwise 
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where  v(t) is [v~(t) vd(t)]', and f = gd + RKda  -  (1 + R)Kd. 
The VAR for employment  and real wages  is then 
y(t) =  Auy(t -  1) +  Buy(t -  2) +  e(t),  (5.21) 
where 
A = Fu,TCT-IF,  +  FJ,  and  B, =-F,,TuCT1J,.  (5.22) 
Pu +a  0 
(f  +  KdRpu)(Pu -  Pd)  +  af +  Kd  Pd 
-- apu 
B=  (5.23) 
-apu[f  +  KdR(pu -  Pd)] -  KdPd  0 
As in the competitive  model,  the second  column  of Bu is zero (since the 
second column of Ju  is zero), so w(t -  2) does not enter either equation of 
the  VAR.  In  addition,  all of  the  matrices in  equation  (5.22) are lower 
triangular, so w(t -  1) is excluded from the employment  equation, and the 
real wage  does  not Granger-cause employment.  The three nonzero  roots 
are p,,  Pd  and the "hysteresis" parameter a, where p, and a appear in the 
employment  equation, and Pd is the coefficient of w(t -  1) in the real wage 
equation. 
After subjecting equation (5.23) to some algebraic torture, estimates can 
be extracted of all of the structural parameters of the Blanchard-Summers 
model.  Table 7 shows  results  for hours  worked  and  real (CPI-deflated) 
wages.20 The roots of the VAR do not involve any demand-side parameters 
except  for  the  serial correlation parameter of  the  demand  shock.  This 
means that there is not much room for adjustment costs as an explanation 
of the serial correlation in employment and real wages.  In fact the estimates 
of the demand parameters Kd  and (d (= l/g)  are very weak, since they come 
mainly from wobbly estimates of the off-diagonal coefficients in the VAR. 
The point estimate of  (  generally has the wrong  sign,  and the estimated 
adjustment  cost  is  negative  for  the  U.S.  It is  possible,  however,  that 
plausible  structural parameter values  could be  found  that would  give  a 
reasonable fit to the data. 
20. Using employment  data in place of hours worked might be more in the spirit of the 
insider-outsider  model, but the empirical  results  are equally  discouraging  when employ- 
ment data are used. Table 7  ESTIMATES  OF THE BLANCHARD-SUMMERS MODEL 
VAR coefficients  (standard  errors) 
Hours Worked Eq"  Real Wage Eq"  Roots 
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Both the competitive model and the Blanchard-Summers model attribute 
two  roots of the VAR to serial correlation in the disturbances. The other 
root is explained by adjustment costs in the competitive model, and by the 
union's  policy  of  protecting  insiders  in  the  Blanchard-Summers model. 
Thus the observed inertia in employment is explained by saying either that 
employers  find it expensive  to make rapid changes,  or that unions  do not 
allow rapid changes.  In either case the inertia in real wages is attributed to 
a shock that is close to a random walk. The Blanchard-Summers model calls 
this  the  technology  shock,  while  the  version  of  the  competitive  model 
displayed  in  Table 6 calls it the  preference  shock.  The remaining  serial 
correlation  is  mopped  up  by  mildly  persistent  shocks  in  the  union's 
preferences,  or in technology. 
6. Conclusion 
The empirical findings  in this paper are consistent  with the view  that an 
equilibrium model driven mostly by labor demand shocks requires a large 
short-run labor supply elasticity in order to explain why employment varies 
more than the real wage.  Whether a large elasticity is implausible depends 
on one's  view  of the estimates  extracted from panel data on individuals 
(see,  for example,  Ashenfelter  (1984), and  the  discussion  by  Heckman 
(1984)). 
As  Card (1987) points  out,  low  supply  elasticities estimated  from the 
micro data do  not  arise because  individuals  are reluctant to vary hours 
worked.  In fact, the standard deviation of year-to-year changes  in hours 
worked  at the individual level is on the order of 20 percent in U.S.  data, 
while in a typical cyclical downturn  the change in aggregate hours is less 
than 3 percent. Thus, the individual variations are an order of magnitude 
larger than is needed  to explain cyclical fluctuations. The trouble is that the 
source of the individual variations is not pinned  down  in the microdata, 
and in particular, variations in hours are not associated with variations in 
wages.21 
The level of time aggregation seems  crucial in matching the micro data 
and  the  aggregate  data.  The  micro  elasticity  estimates  are  based  on 
life-cycle models  that were not designed  to measure short-run elasticities. 
In fact,  these  models  assume  that leisure  in  February 1989 is  a perfect 
substitute  for  leisure  in  October  1989.  The  life-cycle  model  produces 
estimates like .1 for the elasticity that governs the redistribution of leisure 
21. Note that there are also large variations in wages at the individual level, as was shown  by 
Altonji  and  Ashenfelter  (1980), although  the  transitory variations  emphasized  in  the 
intertemporal substitution model are much smaller than the whole. Employment  and  Real  Wages  *  197 
over the life-cycle in response to movements along the age-earnings profile. 
This is consistent with short-run behavior in which workers care only about 
total consumption  and total leisure time, averaged over several months  or 
a year, provided  that the work schedule  is not too extreme (e.g.  18-hour 
days or 84-hour weeks).  Indeed, a short-run elasticity of .1 is not credible: 
a 30 percent wage increase is not needed  to call forth a 3 percent increase 
in hours worked (this would  mean that in order to get someone  to stay 15 
minutes longer on the job today, he would have to be paid 30 percent more 
for the whole  day).22 In the standard econometric version of the life-cycle 
model,  a business  cycle consisting of regular oscillations within a period of 
six months  would  generate no real-wage response.  What is needed  is an 
analysis  of the response  to irregular oscillations with  a period of several 
years, in the context of a life-cycle model with a period length  of days or 
weeks. 
This paper has  also emphasized  the importance of accounting  for the 
serial correlation in  employment  and  real wages  within  an  equilibrium 
model. For example, a particular  reading of serial correlation was crucial in 
obtaining a plausible structural interpretation of the  U.K.  data. A better 
understanding  of  serial correlation might  be  gained  by interpreting real 
wages  as the shadow  price of labor services in a stochastic growth model. 
For example, Hansen and Sargent (1987) have recently used such a model 
to analyze  the equilibrium premium for overtime,  although  they  do  not 
develop  the implied time-series properties of real wages. 
Finally,  this  paper  has  dealt  only  with  the  basic  building-blocks  of 
dynamic equilibrium models  of the labor market. The empirical work has 
concentrated on cataloging the facts to be explained, and assessing whether 
equilibrium explanations  are worth  pursuing.  I think  they  are.  But the 
paper has ignored obviously  relevant information in order to concentrate 
on basic structural explanations of the variability, covariability, and serial 
correlation found in employment  and real-wage data. As Mark Bils points 
out in his comment below, the "unobservable" supply and demand shocks 
in  the  models  discussed  above  correspond  substantially  to  observable 
movements  in  output,  capital,  taxes,  incomes  policies,  and  so  forth. 
Indeed,  many  one-sided  models  of  aggregate  labor supply  or demand 
include a rich collection of explanatory variables, but these models  do not 
explain how  the equilibrium real wage  is determined.  The next step is to 
22. Introspection  gives imprecise  estimates  of the elasticity  of supply. If I say that  your wage 
rate is going up temporarily  by 10 percent  and ask how much extra  you want to work 
in response, the answer  may be essentially  nil. If, instead,  I say that  you are  being asked 
to work 10 percent  more, and ask how much your wage rate  has to be raised  to get you 
to agree to this, the answer is perhaps that the usual wage is good enough. One of 
these estimates  gives a zero elasticity,  and the other  gives an infinite  elasticity. 198 *  KENNAN 
bring such variables into the equilibrium model,  through modifications in 
the assumptions  about preferences and technology. 
Appendix  A: Derivations 
THE ELASTICITIES  IN TABLE 1 
Write the variance matrix of the shocks as 
s2  Urd  82 8r 
Var[n(t)]  = 
s  =  (A.1) 
OCsd  Cd  8r 1 
where r is the correlation coefficient of q7  and  qd. Then the variance matrix 
of employment  and real wages  in the static model is 
n(t)  1 
Cov  = 
w(t)  (g  -  gd)2 
r2  +  O  -  20asd  o-sgd  +  Or'gs  -  (gs  +  gd)sd  (A. 
CTsgd  +  0igs 
-  (gs  +  gd)(sd  sgd  +  LST  -  2gsgdUsd 
Define  the variance ratio a2  =  Var(w)/Var(n), and the correlation coeffi- 
cient Cnw =  Cov(n,w)/[Var(n)Var(w)]1/2.  Then 
g[1  +  82a2  +  2a8r] 
a2  1  2  (A.3)  awn  1  +  82  -  2r 
(A3) 
1  -  82a  +  (a  -  1)8r 
C,w  (A.4) 
[(1  +  82  -  28r)(1  +  82a2 +  2a8r)]1/2  ( 
where a  =  -gd/gs.  Let b,w  =  Cnw  an  denote the regression coefficient of w 
on  n, and note  that the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality means  (bwn)2  -  a2 
The estimates in Table 1 assume  that the supply  and demand  shocks are 
uncorrelated (r =  0). Then 
a2=  +  (1 -  )gs  (A.5) 
and 
bwn =  gd  +  (1 -  )gs  (A.6) Employment  and  Real  Wages  *  199 
where 
o2  2 
2  +  r  =  1  2  (A.7)  2cr  +  (  1+ 4  2 
When a value is assigned to 8, equations (A.5) and (A.6) can be solved to 
obtain the supply and demand elasticities. Rearrange and square equation 
(A.6) to get 
(bn)2  - 
2tugdbWn  +  tI2g5  =  (1-  I_  )2g2  (A.8) 
(bwn)2  -  2gdbwn  +  /2g% =  (1  -  q,)a2  n  -  4(1  -  _ 
)g3  (A.9) 
l(bwn)2  -  2fgdbwn  +  ,g  =  (1  -  q)[a2n  -  (bwn)2]  (A.10) 
So23 
gd  =  bwn  -  (1/)[a2n  -  (bw)2]1/2  =  awn[Cnw  -  (1/8)(1  -  C2w)1/2]  (A.11) 
and 
gs  =  bwn +  8 [awn -  (bn)2]1/2  =  a,n[Cnw  +  (1  -  C,2)1/2]  (A.12) 
VARIABILITY  AND CORRELATION  IN THE  DYNAMIC 
EQUILIBRIUM  MODEL 
From equations  (5.6) and (5.7) the innovations  en(t) and Ew(t)  in employ- 
ment and real wages  can be written as 
p,  -1  1 
?n(t)  =  r  (t)  +  1 
d(t)  (A.13) 
Ks +  Kd  1  -  RAtps  1  -  Rd,pd 
1 
W(t)  =  g  En(t)  +  [Kd nrs(t)  +  KS '7d(t)]  (A.14) 
KS +  Kd 
Thus 
n(t)  =  d(t)  -  v(t)  (A.15) 
23. There  are two solutions.  In a diagram  with  /1  -  /,g  on the horizontal  and V/gd  on the 
vertical  axes, equation  (A.5)  is a circle  around  the origin,  and equation  (A.6)  is a straight 
line with negative  slope. I pick the southeast  solution,  which practically  ensures  that the 
demand  elasticity  is negative. 200 *  KENNAN 
ew(t)  =  avd(t)  -  adv(t)  (A.16) 
where 
/~  1  1  d  1 
v(t)  =  rs(t);  Vd(t)=  r  d(t)  (A. 17) 
Ks +  Kd  1  -  Rtzps  Ks +  Kd  1  -  RALzpd 
and 
Ks(l  -  Rtpd)  Kd(l  -  Rtps) 
as  =  g  +  ;  ad  =  g  -  (A.18) 
The variance matrix of the innovations  then has a form similar to that 
shown  in equation (A.2) above for the static model: 
/I2 
Var[E(t)] = 
(Ks  +  Kd)2 
tr +  Tr  -  2rsd  rTas  +  rad  -  (as  +  ad)rsd 
rta,  +  7Tad  -  (as  +  ad)7Td  rT2a  +  7ra  2  -  2asadTsd 
where 
Ors  O'd  O'sd 
r7s =  ;  r  =  ;  Ted =  (A.20) 
1  -  R=tps  1  -  RPd  (1  -  R  Lpd)(1  -  Rpps)(l  RP  (d) 
The correlation between  the employment  and real-wage innovations  is 
1  -  S2ao  +  (ao  -  1)S,r 
Corr[e,(t),  ew(t)] =  (A 21) 
[(1  +  82  2&6r)(1  +  8, a  +  2ao87r)]/2 
where  aO  =  -ad/as,  and  , =  r/Td.  Evidently,  if  86 is  zero  then  the 
innovations  are perfectly correlated. Also, if 86  is small then the correlation 
is well approximated by 
1  -  a2ao  +  (ao  -  1) ,r 
Corr[E,(t), Ew(t)] =  +  (A.22) 
(1  +  a  +  2ao8Tr) 
Note  that if Ps  is close to unity, while Pd is close to zero (as is true in Table 
6),  8, will be much  larger than 8, and this reduces  the correlation of the Employment  and  Real  Wages  - 201 
innovations.  Also,  if a0 is large in magnitude,  the correlation may be far 
from unity,  even  when  8, is small.  This means  that even  if the  supply 
shocks  are small in terms of their influence  on the employment  innova- 
tions,  they  may  nevertheless  be  enough  to  explain why  the  correlation 
between  the employment  and real-wage innovations  is small. This possi- 
bility is governed  by the magnitude of a0, which is determined by 
-ad  Kd(l  -  Rtp,,)  -  gRp  (A 
Cao =  =  (A.23) 
as  Ks(1  -  RgApd) +  gAx 
In Table 6 the estimates of Ks are near zero, while  Kd is very large, so that aO 
is  large.  This  configuration  allows  the  dynamic  model  to  explain  small 
correlations between  the employment  and real wage innovations. Appendix  B: Data 
Table A-1  VARIABILITY  OF MANUFACTURING WAGES AND  RELATED  SERIES 
U.S.  Canada  U.K.  Japan  U.S.  U.S.  Canada  Canada 
Period  1948-86  54-86  62-83  61-85  48-69  70-86  54-69  70-86 
Nominal wage  0.43%  0.61%  1.49%  1.04%  0.43%  0.39%  0.48%  0.61% 
Wholesale price  0.59%  0.54%  0.63%  0.77%  0.45%  0.68%  0.23%  0.61% 
Consumer price  0.39%  0.41%  0.75%  0.74%  0.33%  0.37%  0.31%  0.38% 
Interest Rate  0.53%  0.55%  0.66%  0.41%  0.19%  0.78%  0.35%  0.70% 
Money Supply  (M1)  0.77%  1.54%  1.40%  1.70%  0.59%  0.58%  1.10%  1.56% 
Explanation:  All variables except the interest rate are measured  in logs.  Variability is measured by regressing the first difference of each variable on a constant  and monthly 
dummies,  and taking the standard error of the residual from this regression. 
Data Sources  and Definitions:  Austria 1954,1 to 1984,3 (from Klaus Neusser) 
1: cpi 1954,1 1984,3 1958-100 
2: 1 1956,1 to 1984,1 
6: wpi  1963,1 to 1984,3 1964-100 
7: wl  1965,1 to 1984,1  wage: excludes  "extra-payments" 
9: ml  1957,6 to 1984,5 
10: r 1964,11 to 1984,6  govt bonds,  secondary  market 
Canada 1947,1 to 1987,1 
index of employment  (cansim d1318) linked to index of same name in oecd main economic  indicators, base  1975-100 
old wpi series: industry price indexes,  industry  selling prices, d500000 catalog 62-011 monthly,  ended  in december  1985 
new wpi series: industrial product  price for mfg,  d614001, beginning  in 1981. 
Old series spliced to new  by multiplying  by their ratio for 1981 
Employment index changed  in 1983 to oecd index,  base year 1980. 
Denmark, (1971,1) to (1986,12) from oecd mei 
cpi "all items" in hist supplement,  Dec 1984, and in cpi section  of monthly 
cpi "excluded indirect taxes" in mei monthly 
employment: mining and manufacturing  (wage earners) thousands 
hourly earnings: mining and manufacturing  (wage earners) 1980-100 
monthly hours worked: mining  and  manufacturing (wage  earners) 1980-100 japan 1952,1 to 1985,12 
arbci-annual report on business  cycle indicators,  economic  planning  agency,  japanese  government  ha39.j3k4 
See also year book of labour statistics, 331.0652 j35 
Monthly statistics of japan  315.2 j352ms 
1. Index of regular workers employed,  mfg,  arbci #179,  (not oecd) 
2. Index of hours worked  per mo.  Regular workers, mfg, arbci #181 
Hours worked exclude rest periods,  paid or unpaid. 
3. Index of regular wages  and salaries, reg. Workers, mfg.  1980-100 
this series is called "contractual cash earnings" in year book 
not published  in monthly  statistics of japan, or in oecd 
4. Index of wholesale  prices, mfg ind.  Products, arbci #203 
5. Consumer price index,  all commodities,  all japan, arbci #208  data for 1952-1959 from monthly  statistics of japan 
9. M1 money  supply,  oecd 
10. Interest rate on call money,  oecd 
UK (1953,1) to (1986,12) 
h is an index of average weekly  hours  worked  per operative in manufacturing base  1962-100. Historical abstract table 148; yearbook  table 79 
Dept of Employment Gazette,  Aug  1962 pp 305-307, and Oct 63, page 404 "In February 1972 and again in January, February and March 1974, the volume of overtime  and 
short-time was affected by the energy  crisis." Year Book 1974, page  198, note.  Hours  fell by about 6.5% in Feb 1972, and by about  10% in Jan and Feb 1974. 
w is basic hourly rates of wages  in manufacturing  (index) base July 1972 These are rates negotiated  in national collective agreements,  and do not reflect local variations. 
r: 91-day t-bills ("average rate of allotment  on last issue of month") mei 
U.S. (1947,1) to (1987,3) 
LPWM6  production workers on mfg payrolls nsa citibase 
PZR  cpi revised wage  earners, nsa,  citibase 
LEXMO  ahe excluding ot mfg,  production  workers,  nsa, citibase 
total production worker payroll divided  by (total production  worker hours  +  1/2 total overtime hours). 
PWM  producer price index manufactured  goods,  citibase, nsa 
LPHRM6  awh production workers on  mfg payrolls, nsa, citibase 
Hours means hours paid for during the pay period including  the 12th of the month.  Paid vacation and sick leave  is included. 
fygm3  3-month t-bill rates secondary  market citibase 
fzml  old ml  1947-1979,1 citibase 
fzml  new ml  1959-1981,12 citibase 
Employment data adjusted  to March 1986 benchmark 
The data are available on diskette. 204  KENNAN 
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MARK BILS 
University  of Rochester,  Visiting  the NBER 
John  Kennan  examines  implications  of  a  market-clearing view  of  the 
behavior of employment  and wage rates. Employing data for a half dozen 
countries, Kennan goes far beyond the narrow question of whether there is 
a "procyclical real-wage puzzle"  or "countercyclical real-wage puzzle"  to 
ask  what  restrictions on  labor supply  and  demand  are implied  by  the 
relative variability of wages  and employment  and the autocorrelations of 
the two series, as well as their correlation. This is a very useful exercise. I 
think it can be  viewed  as  augmenting  the  empirical real business  cycle 
literature (e.g.,  Prescott, 1986) which typically has ignored matching model 
predictions to actual behavior of wage rates. 
Under an assumption  that disturbances to labor demand  predominate, 
one  conclusion  Kennan  draws  is  that for the  actual fluctuations  to  be 
consistent  with  market clearing fluctuations a relatively flat labor supply 
curve (high elasticity of labor supply) is required. Of course,  this is not a 
novel  or surprising result, and is not marketed as such.  A further result, 
which  I think is an insight  of the  exercise,  is that the  data require two 
separate theoretical sources for strong autocorrelation. This is because the 
orthogonal components  of wage  and employment  series each show  great 
persistence.  Kennan  suggests  this might be consistent  with  high  adjust- 
ment  costs  to  the  firm  of  adjusting  labor  input,  together  with  very 
persistent disturbances driving the labor demand process; but this further 
requires that innovations to the labor supply process be white noise or even 
negatively  serially correlated. Finally, a single framework does not appear 
applicable across the different countries. Either supply  and demand  elas- 
ticities or the relative variability of demand  and supply  must vary across 
countries. 
One major criticism of Kennan's exercise is that the model he examines- 
employment  and wages  continuously  varying to equate  supply  and  de- 
mand-is  very much a strawman. In the aftermath of implicit-contracting 
theory,  one  reasonably  popular view  of  the  labor market is  that while 
compensation  payments  are smoothed  for insurance, tax, or convenience 
reasons,  firms and  workers  may  exploit  other mechanisms  to  arrive at 
choices  for employment  that approximately equate supply  and demand. 
Recently Rhee and Espinosa (1987) have shown  that in a repeated game, 
labor  outcomes  arbitrarily close  to  equating  supply  and  demand  are Comments  207 
possible even if the wage rate is not close to the market clearing value. Their 
results  support  Hall's  (1980) contention  that long-term  attachments  be- 
tween firms and workers may provide a setting for achieving efficient labor 
choices despite rigidly set wages.  In such a setting the wage series has a life 
of its own; and thus Kennan's approach of describing restrictions generated 
on  wage  series  from  market clearing will  not  be  appropriate.  That is, 
concluding  that the wage  and employment  series together are not gener- 
ated from the intersection of supply and demand does not tell you that the 
employment  series is not so generated; and presumably it is the behavior 
of employment  that is of primary interest.  Of course,  the view  of wage 
payments as pure installment payments is an equally extreme view.  It may 
require a level of cooperation between  firms and workers that one might 
argue  we  do  not  observe.  Furthermore,  the  empirical  success  of  this 
literature to date consists of having sufficiently weak empirical predictions 
that it is difficult to refute. 
Kennan asks whether an equilibrium model is consistent with the data, 
given reasonable values for such factors as the importance of supply versus 
demand  disturbances, the elasticities of labor supply and demand,  persis- 
tence  of  supply  and  demand  disturbances,  and  the  importance  of  past 
employment  in supply and demand decisions.  A major problem with this 
approach,  however,  is  that we  really have  only  weak  notions  for what 
constitutes  reasonable values for each of these factors. 
For example,  in  much  of  the  paper  Kennan  assumes  that  demand 
disturbances are of principal importance. But this completely depends  on 
what macro disturbances are affecting the economy.  If we assume  market 
clearing in the goods  market as well as in labor, then disturbances to the 
demand for goods,  such as changes in government spending or temporary 
changes in firms' investment rates (for example, due to a temporary change 
in  tax  rates)  will  affect  aggregate  employment  principally  by  shifting 
aggregate labor supply.  The prediction of countercyclical real wages  is not 
a Keynesian  proposition,  but rather dates at least to Marshall; it presum- 
ably followed from a view that cycles are generated by disturbances whose 
impact is primarily through the demand for goods.  I think it is much more 
difficult to propose  plausible disturbances that shift the demand for labor. 
Disturbances  that  clearly  do  have  this  effect  are  shifts  in  production 
functions,  such as those  stressed by empirical real business  models. 
An  alternative  to  assuming  the  relative  importance  of  demand  and 
supply  disturbances is to incorporate additional information that provides 
conditional  estimates  of whether  a disturbance is from labor demand  or 
supply.  For example,  conditional on government  spending  increases, our 
guess  should  be that an increase in employment  reflects a disturbance to 
labor supply.  Similarly, conditional on productivity increases,  we  should 208  BILS 
anticipate a positive disturbance to marginal productivity, and thus to labor 
demand.  That is, if employment  increases together with productivity this 
should  raise our  conditional  expectation  of  a labor demand  increase; if 
employment  increases together with productivity decreasing this suggests 
that the employment  increase is resulting from an increase in labor supply. 
I took a very preliminary step at such an analysis  of the U.S.  data by 
looking at the correlation of real wages,  not only with labor hours, but also 
with an interaction of labor hours and productivity. The data for manufac- 
turing employment,  workweek,  hourly compensation,  and price deflators 
are  the  same  as  those  used  by  Kennan.  For output  I used  industrial 
production  for manufacturing.  Although  the data are monthly,  I simply 
examined the annual percentage changes from June to June for 1947 to 1986 
in  labor hours,  real wages,  and  productivity  (output  per  labor hour). 
Ignoring  productivity  I find  an  acyclical real wage.  Results  regressing 
real-wage changes on a time trend and labor changes are given in columns 
one  and  three  of  Table  1.  The  CPI deflated  wage  is  ever  so  slightly 
countercyclical and the producer-price deflated wage is slightly procyclical. 
In  columns  two  and  four  I  include  labor  change/productivity  change 
interactions. Contrary to what we would anticipate, the wage is more likely 
to increase with hours when  productivity declines than when  it increases. 
For the producer-price deflated wage  this paradoxical result is statistically 
significant. 
This result is troubling for real business  cycle theories; it implies  that 
efforts to match model predictions for the shadow  price of labor to hourly 
wage data are probably doomed.  The result is equally troubling, however, 
Table  1  EXPLAINING  ANNUAL  PERCENTAGE  CHANGES  (FROM  JUNE  TO 
JUNE)  IN REAL  WAGES,  1947  TO 1986 
CPI Deflated  PPI Deflated 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  .0320  .0310  .0220  .0175 
(4.86)  (4.65)  (1.76)  (1.48) 
(t -  1946)  -.00091  -.00088  -.00047  -.00030 
(-3.75)  (-3.61)  (-1.02)  (-0.69) 
Aln(L)  -.0637  .0069  .3936  .7001 
(-0.31)  (0.03)  (1.02)  (1.85) 
[Aln(L)][Aln(Y/L)]  -1.89  -8.22 
(-1.02)  (-2.50) 
R2  .288  .309  .074  .215 
D-W  2.01  1.91  1.57  1.30 
L  is total  hours (employment  times workweek)  from  the BLS;  Y is industrial  production. Comments  209 
for many other business  cycle theories. For example, it has been suggested 
that procyclical real wages,  particularly for the past twenty years, might be 
explained  by  augmenting  traditional Keynesian  models  with  occasional 
supply disturbances. But the wage behavior presented in Table 1 is at odds 
with that solution. 
Elasticity of labor supply  is also a parameter on  which  estimates  and 
views  greatly  differ.  Given  Kennan's  assumption  that  labor  demand 
disturbances predominate, the data require an elastic labor supply to fit an 
equilibrium model.  Kennan suggests  that in the short-run, with which he 
is concerned, we might expect high supply elasticity, even if workers very 
much dislike working long hours for extended  periods. Although  this is a 
valid point, it is also true that what we view as cyclical phases generally are 
fairly extended  periods. 
Work by  Rogerson  (1984) and  others  suggests  that allowing  labor to 
increase  both  along  extensive  (bodies)  and  intensive  (hours  per  body) 
margins can imply a much larger labor supply elasticity than the intensive 
margin alone. Much of the micro evidence upon which our priors are partly 
based,  however,  already includes adjustment along the extensive  margin; 
and in sum these studies suggest  much smaller aggregate elasticities than 
the 2.0 to 2.5 that Kennan suggests  are needed  (see Hall, 1980b). 
Furthermore, movements  in  workweeks  are not  without  importance. 
Some  of Rogerson's  work and  the application by Hansen  (1985) employ 
models where all persons are identical. When individuals are identical the 
best way  to expand  aggregate labor is to add workers with  no change in 
hours per worker; workers can be added at constant cost, whereas longer 
hours  per worker incurs increasing cost due  to rising marginal utility of 
leisure.  Jang-Ok  Cho  (1987) has  extended  such  a  model  to  include 
heterogeneity  among workers. As the workforce expands it is necessary to 
bring in persons who are increasingly at a comparative disadvantage in the 
workplace.  This implies  that an  expansion  is  optimally  achieved  partly 
through additional persons  working and partly through existing workers 
working longer hours. Cho finds that achieving movements  in workweeks 
of the magnitude observed in U.S. data would require sufficient heteroge- 
neity that it greatly reduces the response of employment,  and total labor to 
an increase in productivity. Looking at the numbers in Kennan's Table 1, 
we see that the changes in workweeks are of far less relative importance in 
the U.S.  than the other countries. Thus Cho's analysis would  be seen  far 
more striking if conducted for these other countries. In both Japan and the 
U.K.  the  standard deviation  of employment  is only  slightly greater than 
one-fourth the standard deviation of total hours. It is not possible to explain 
high labor supply  elasticities in these countries by means of elastic exten- 
sive margins. 210  TAYLOR 
Finally, we certainly have weak priors on how to attribute causes of serial 
persistence.  For instance,  I would  have  guessed  a different pattern than 
Kennan suggests  for allocating the two large roots and one zero or negative 
root that he  finds.  I have no  qualms with  assuming  considerable persis- 
tence  in  labor supply  disturbances; movements  in  labor supply  should 
largely reflect movements  in permanent income,  which  should  obviously 
be persistent,  or movements  in real interest rates, which  also appear to 
exhibit  considerable  persistence.  By  contrast,  I  would  anticipate  little 
persistence caused by the dependence  of employment demand and supply 
on past employment.  For production workers the evidence  suggests  small 
costs  of  adjustment  for labor demand  (e.g.,  Shapiro,  1986). We  might 
anticipate a negative  dependence  of labor supply  on  past  employment. 
Leisure today may be a substitute for leisure tomorrow (as modeled  in the 
paper).  Similarly,  expiration  of  unemployment  benefits  could  create  a 
negative dependence.  Katz (1986) has documented  the strong tendency  of 
U.S.  firms to recall workers as the time benefits expire. 
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Finally, we certainly have weak priors on how to attribute causes of serial 
persistence.  For instance,  I would  have  guessed  a different pattern than 
Kennan suggests  for allocating the two large roots and one zero or negative 
root that he  finds.  I have no  qualms with  assuming  considerable persis- 
tence  in  labor supply  disturbances; movements  in  labor supply  should 
largely reflect movements  in permanent income,  which  should  obviously 
be persistent,  or movements  in real interest rates, which  also appear to 
exhibit  considerable  persistence.  By  contrast,  I  would  anticipate  little 
persistence caused by the dependence  of employment demand and supply 
on past employment.  For production workers the evidence  suggests  small 
costs  of  adjustment  for labor demand  (e.g.,  Shapiro,  1986). We  might 
anticipate a negative  dependence  of labor supply  on  past  employment. 
Leisure today may be a substitute for leisure tomorrow (as modeled  in the 
paper).  Similarly,  expiration  of  unemployment  benefits  could  create  a 
negative dependence.  Katz (1986) has documented  the strong tendency  of 
U.S.  firms to recall workers as the time benefits expire. 
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Denmark, and Austria-be  explained by an equilibrium model of the labor 
market? Kennan addresses the question in two ways: first, by estimating a 
simple  static two-equation  equilibrium model of the labor market in each 
country,  and second  by estimating a more complex dynamic equilibrium 
model with explicit taste, technology,  and adjustment cost parameters. To 
help assess  the adequacy of the dynamic model,  he also estimates alterna- 
tive "non-equilibrium" models  of the labor market. 
Estimating dynamic equilibrium models  is a difficult task, but it is clear 
that  the  estimated  parameters  and  the  goodness  of  fit  measures  that 
emerge from this study provide valuable information about the usefulness 
of these  types  of models.  The novel  data set  on  monthly  employment, 
hours and real wages  (unadjusted for seasonal variation) that Kennan has 
assembled for six countries also provides useful information. In comment- 
ing  on  the  data and the estimates  I will focus  first on the  static supply- 
demand  model,  second  on the dynamic model,  and third on the class of 
alternative models  that Kennan considers. 
1. Contemporaneous  Correlations  and  Labor  Supply 
Elasticities 
John Kennan's data convincingly reveal the strong empirical regularity that 
there is essentially  no  contemporaneous  correlation between  real wages 
and  employment  (or hours)  over  the business  cycle.  In his Table 1,  for 
example, the correlation between  real wages  and hours in the U.S. is only 
.057 (after a stochastic trend and seasonal factors are removed). In the U.K. 
it is -.007.  Of course, this regularity is not a newly  discovered one, as the 
1977 quote from Robert Lucas at the start of Kennan's paper suggests,  and 
it has been a starting point for many macroeconomic models, including the 
misperception  model of Lucas, staggered contracts models,  and disequili- 
brium models. 
Kennan  gives  a  structural interpretation  to  these  contemporaneous 
correlations by estimating aggregate labor supply elasticities with respect to 
the real wage.  All the elasticities Kennan finds are very high-some  are 
over 10. I found this structural interpretation to be unconvincing,  given the 
observations.  The  high  supply  elasticities  that  Kennan  finds  are  very 
sensitive to his identifying restrictions and his interpretation of the shocks. 
In some  countries-most  strikingly in the U.K.,  Canada, and Japan-the 
labor supply  elasticities could just as plausibly be very low. 
Kennan identifies  the structural parameters by making apriori  assump- 
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that  labor supply  and  demand  shocks  are uncorrelated  and  that  labor 
demand shocks are much larger than labor supply shocks. This method can 
be contrasted with Robert Hall's (1980) attempt to extract aggregate labor 
supply  elasticities from similar correlations using exclusion restrictions (in 
particular by  assuming  that  military  purchases  are  exogenous).  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that Hall obtained  labor supply  elasticities less  than 
one-tenth as large as Kennan's. For example, Hall's elasticity estimate was 
.46  for  labor  supply  measured  by  hours  in  the  U.S.  compared  with 
Kennan's estimate of 10.7 for hours and 4.8 for employment. 
A  simple  scatter  diagram  illustrates  some  problems  with  Kennan's 
structural interpretation of a high labor supply elasticity. Consider Figure 1 
below where a scatter diagram of employment  and real wages for the U.K. 
during the postwar period is shown.  The observations are those used by 
Kennan in his Table 1. Note that the data points are clustered in a vertical 
ellipse,  reflecting the facts that the correlation is near zero (-.02)  and that 
the standard deviation  of employment  (.39) is smaller than the standard 
deviation of real wages  (1.38). The two lines superimposed  on the scatter 
are Kennan's estimates of labor demand  and labor supply.  Note  that the 
supply  curve is relatively flat (the slope is .65) resulting in the high labor 
supply elasticity (1.55) that Kennan reports for the U.K. in his Table 1. 
However,  it is clear that the scatter of observations in Figure 1 could just 
as  easily  be  interpreted  as  being  generated  by  a  labor demand  curve 
shifting along a steep  and relatively stable labor supply  curve.1 Such an 
interpretation would  have  large shocks  to  the  labor demand  curve and 
small  shocks  to  the  labor supply  curve,  and  the  labor supply  elasticity 
would be as small as .1. This appears to be a plausible interpretation of the 
joint movement  of employment  and real wages  in Figure 1. 
Of course not all the observations in Kennan's international cross section 
look like Figure 1, but because of the zero correlation  the scatter diagrams are 
all either vertical ellipses, horizontal ellipses or simply circles. Figure 2 shows 
the data for the U.S., where the real-wage and employment data trace out a 
flat scatter diagram, and where it seems more natural to argue in favor of a 
flat labor supply curve. For Japan the employment and real-wage data look 
much like the U.K. For Canada the employment and real-wage scatter looks 
like a circle, yet the labor supply elasticity is estimated to be 4.9. 
1. The formal statistical reason that Kennan's procedure yields the flat labor supply curve from 
a vertical scatter is that his normalization of the supply and demand  equations forces the 
demand  shocks measured in the vertical  direction to be large relative to the supply shocks 
measured  in the vertical direction. In order to trace out the scatter of points in Figure 1, 
Kennan's  normalization implies  that the labor supply  shocks  measured  in the horizontal 
direction are larger than the labor demand shocks. If one reverses Kennan's normalization 
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2. Dynamic  Equilibrium  Models 
The bulk of Kennan's paper is devoted  not to simple wage-employment 
correlations, but  to estimating  dynamic  equilibrium models  of the  labor 
market. From the  view  point  of evaluating  the  equilibrium model,  it is 
important  to  point  out  that  the  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of  the 
structural parameters are usually implausible. For the U.K.,  for example, 
the  supply  elasticities are negative.  This in  itself would  raise questions 
about the plausibility of this type  of representative agent model,  but the 
structural estimates  have very large standard errors. Kennan shows  that 
Figure  1. EMPLOYMENT  AND REAL  WAGES  IN THE  U.K. 1953-86. 
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more plausible estimates are not significantly different from the maximum 
likelihood estimates in the U.K. It appears that no plausible estimates are 
acceptable for the U.S. using formal statistical tests, but plausible estimates 
for the U.S. do seem capable of yielding autoregressive coefficients that are 
not too far from the unconstrained reduced forms. 
However,  all the structural estimates for the U.K. and the U.S.  require 
random shocks to utility that are highly serially correlated. In other words, 
the equilibrium model, even with cost of adjustment, does not appear to be 
capable of capturing dynamic movements  in employment  without assum- 
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ing that these  movements  are significantly due to serially correlated taste 
shocks. If one views,  as I do, the essential goal of business  cycle theory as 
explaining the dynamics of employment,  as well as the co-movements  with 
other variables, then  the equilibrium model  falls well  short of this goal, 
according to Kennan's preliminary analysis. The movements  in the data are 
explained by exogenous  serial correlation of shocks to tastes. 
3. Alternative  Models 
For comparison purposes,  Kennan also estimates some alternative models 
of  the  labor market, in  particular the  Blanchard-Summers (1986) model 
with  a powerful  national union.  As with  the equilibrium model  Kennan 
finds  that the maximum  likelihood  estimates  of the Blanchard-Summers 
model  are implausible.  For example,  the demand  elasticities are positive. 
Relatively speaking,  therefore, the equilibrium models  do  not appear to 
perform any worse  than available alternatives. 
It should be emphasized  that the model chosen by Kennan is only one of 
several alternatives with  which  he could have compared the equilibrium 
model,  and it is probably not the best alternative in terms of the statistical 
criteria that Kennan  is  using  to  evaluate  models.  As  Kennan  indicates, 
Ashenfelter and Card (1982) consider sticky wage models as an alternative 
to equilibrium models.  Recent work by Benabou and Bismut (1988) indi- 
cates that such sticky wage  models perform well for the U.S. in the sense 
that the maximum likelihood estimates are plausible and cannot be rejected 
against  unconstrained  autoregressions.  By  these  criteria they  seem  to 
perform better than the equilibrium model  that Kennan considers  in his 
paper. 
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to be viewed  cautiously.  He felt a bigger puzzle was the co-movement  of 
average productivity and employment.  Empirically the correlation is neg- 
ative,  while  the  theory  suggests  it  should  be  positive.  Ben  Bemanke 
suggested  that  heterogeneity  might  also  be  important  to  consider  in 
interpreting the reported labor supply  elasticities. For instance,  heteroge- 
neity may arise from differences in individuals reservation wages. 
Several comments  addressed the adequacy of the dynamic specification 
of the model. James Stock felt the Granger causality tests should have been 
carried out in rates of growth  instead of in levels.  He also reported that 
using a more general VAR (with 6 lags) he had found significantly different 
dynamics.  Matthew Shapiro also pointed out that it may be worth consid- 
ering different types  of labor and differences in adjustment costs.  In this 
case the dynamic equation for total labor is likely to be more complicated 
than Kennan's specification. Lawrence Christiano noted that taste shocks 
and  cost  of  adjustment  dynamics  may  be  hard  to  separately  identify. 
Kennan  agreed  that  all  these  considerations  were  important  but  that 
analytical as well  as data limitations would  make them  very  difficult to 
implement.  Robert Gordon questioned  whether the effects of the produc- 
tivity slowdown  has been properly handled in the estimation. He also felt 
that the cyclical fluctuations of real wages has changed since 1970 and that 
this should  have been discussed  in the paper. 
Finally,  Ben  Bemanke  and  Robert Hall worried  that the  omission  of 
movements  of interest rates could be important, especially in the light of 
real business  cycles models.  Kennan argued that empirically the interest 
rate effects were dominated by real wage  movements. 